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Dissent, Posner-Style: Judge Richard A.
Posner's First Decade of Dissenting
Opinions, 1981-1991-Toward an
Aesthetics of Judicial Dissenting Style
Robert F. Blomquist
I. INTRODUCTION
Reflecting the American obsession with style,' an eclectic body of legal
scholarship has emerged on appellate judicial opinion style, focusing on opinions
written for a majority of an appellate court.2 Prominent themes in this
scholarship are the impact of burgeoning caseloads on the quality of appellate
opinions;3 the political nature of majority opinion style;4 the "portable" and
"abiding" quality of vivid judicial opinion writing style;5 the differences between
the relatively formalistic and solemn "pure" judicial opinion style and the
relatively relaxed and conventional "impure" opinion style;6 the impact of
phrase-specific and concept-specific computer-assisted legal research on opinion
style;7 the capacity for well-crafted and artfully-written appellate judicial
opinions to dignify the law;' the way that "poets as judges" are able to imagine
a litigant's pain and pathos and give it legal significance;9 the link between an
appellate judge's personality and the style of her opinions; and the relationship
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a Ph.D. in English and a J.D.) for loving constructive criticism and emotional support.
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1. Robert F. Blomquist, Playing on Words: Judge Richard A. Posner 's Appellate
Opinions, 1981-82-Ruminations on Sexy Judicial Opinion Style During an
Extraordinary Rookie Season, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 651, 651 (2000).
2. See id. at 656-83.
3. Id. at 657-58 (discussing the insight of Judge Patricia M. Wald).
4. Id. at 658-59 (discussing the thinking of Judge Patricia M. Wald).
5. Id. at 660-61 (discussing the scholarship of Judge Richard A. Posner).
6. Id. at 661-65 (discussing the views of Judge Richard A. Posner).
7. Id. at 666-68 (discussing the insight of Professor Frederick Schauer).
8. Id. at 669 (discussing the thinking of Professor James Boyd White).
9. Id. at 670-73 (discussing the scholarship of Professor Martha C. Nussbaum).
10. Id. at 673-76 (discussing the writing of attorney William Domnarski).
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between hard, meticulous preparatory opinion "construction" work and well-
written appellate opinions."
Style is an ambiguous concept, 2 and the style of Judge Richard A. Posner,
former Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, is worth trying to pin down. In a New Yorker piece on Posner, Larissa
MacFarquhar asked: "How did a judge with such subversive ideas become a
leading influence on American legal opinion?"' 3 The reason goes beyond the
popularity of his frequent deployment of law and economics principles. Posner's
appeal stems from his interest in the economic motivation of litigants and the
"style" he has developed that embodies this interest-a style which also reflects
his underlying judicial character and legal philosophy of pragmatism. Posner's
dissenting opinions from the first decade of his career, set against the foil of the
majority decisions he could not agree with, allow us to illuminate his unique
style of contrarian thinking.
The threefold purpose and structure of this Article is as follows. First, in
Part II, before plunging into Judge Posner's dissenting opinions, I search for a
preliminary description of the praxis of modem American dissenting opinion
style by drawing upon previous legal scholarship and examples of judicial
dissents; this discussion will include an examination of some relevant scholarly
writings on opinion style by Judge Richard A. Posner himself.'4 In Part III, I
analyze the published dissenting opinions written by Judge Posner during 1981-
1991 (his first decade on the federal appellate bench), evaluating the stylistics of
these dissents including his sophisticated use of rhetorical devices. 5 Finally, in
Part IV I offer some conclusions about Judge Posner's early dissenting opinion
style, and comment on the implications of my study for understanding the
aesthetics of dissenting opinions. 6
11. Id. at 676-80 (discussing the insight of Judge Frank M. Coffin).
12. Id. at 651. Contrary to speculation, I was not "one of [Judge Posner's] law
clerks" and do not have "a lot of appeals in the Seventh Circuit." Thomas E. Baker, A
Compendium of Clever andAmusing Law Review Writings, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 105,135
(2002). "Judge Posner has written more books than some of us have read" and he "is not
exactly Jerry Seinfeld, or even Woody Allen." Id. Yet for four reasons his judicial
opinions are worthy of study. First, Posner is "probably the most famous and influential
non-Supreme Court jurist in the United States." Blomquist, supra note 1, at 732.
Second, he is "one of the brightest persons currently sitting on any appellate court in the
world." Id. Third, he actually writes his own judicial opinions-unlike most appellate
judges (using his law clerks solely for research). Id. Fourth, he is "an omnivorous reader
who is inclined to reflect his reading in his opinions." Id.
13. Larissa MacFarquhar, The Bench Burner, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 10, 2001,
at 78.
14. See infra notes 17-137 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 138-477 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 478-517 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 69
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II. THE PRAXIS OF DISSENTING OPINIONS
A. Background
Professor, and former state supreme court justice, Robert A. Leflar collected
a number of interesting quotations from published legal scholarship and
dissenting appellate opinions in his 1974 book, Appellate Judicial Opinions.'
7
His work is an appropriate starting point for examining the evolution of critical
American thought on the role and function of dissenting opinions. Professor
Leflar noted that, consistent with English practice in the late eighteenth century
at the time of America's founding as an independent nation, "[j]udicial custom
... permitted each judge on a multi-judge court to deliver his individual opinion
in each case."'" The United States Supreme Court initially picked up on the
English practice of seriatim judicial opinions in the first decade of the Court's
history; however, Chief Justice John Marshall, "[s]ilently and without fanfare,"
prevailed upon his colleagues on the Court to abandon this practice and speak
with the unified voice of a single opinion for the Court during the period of 1801
to 1823. ' The Marshall-led unity ofa monolithic High Court opinion eventually
cracked under pressure from ex-President Thomas Jefferson-a bitter political
enemy of John Marshall-in a letter written to Associate Justice William
Johnson in October of 1822.20 According to a book which discusses Jefferson's
1822 letter to Justice Johnson, Jefferson "complained... about the dangers of
excessive judicial nationalism, [and made a] biting attack on Marshall's
leadership that resonated with Johnson."'" Moreover,
[t]o counter Marshall, and silently to subvert the Court's interpretative
authority, Jefferson urged Johnson to reintroduce the practice of
seriatim opinions-which practice, incidentally, the Virginia Court of
Appeals ... had just abandoned [in conformance with Marshall's
practice for the Supreme Court]. What bothered Jefferson, what, he
said, "has long weighed on my mind," was "the habitual mode of
making up and delivering the opinions of the supreme court of the
US." The practice of a single majority opinion written by one
17. APPELLATE JUDICIAL OPINIONS 203-09 (Robert A. Leflar ed., 1974).
18. Id. at 203; see also Karl M. Zo Bell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court,
A History of Judicial Disintegration, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 186, 190-91 (1959).
19. R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME
COURT 157 (Bertram Wyatt-Brown ed., 2001). Marshall's leadership in maintaining the
informal practice of a single unified opinion for the Court came under attack after the
Court decided McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). NEWMYER, supra, at 356.
20. NEWMYER, supra note 19, at 404.
21. Id. at 404-05.
20041
3
Blomquist: Blomquist: Dissent, Posner-Style:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
MISSOURI LA W RE VIEW
justice-John Marshall, that is to say-Jefferson declared, obscured
the real views of the justices: "For nobody knows what opinion any
individual member gave in any case, nor even that he who delivers the
opinion, concurred in it himself. Be the opinion therefore ever so
impeachable, having been done in the dark it can be proved on no
one." Whether impeachable or not, he said, "the practice is certainly
convenient for the lazy, the modest & the incompetent."22
In response to Jefferson's letter, Justice Johnson "took up the challenge,
announcing in his [ 1824] concurrence in Gibbons v. Ogden that he conceived it
his public duty 'to maintain my opinion in my own way. "'12 Thus, except for a
brief period of a little over two decades, from 1801 to 1823, justices of the
Supreme Court have issued separate judicial opinions, including dissenting
opinions.
American appellate court judges, at the state and federal levels, have
followed the lead of United States Supreme Court justices in filing dissenting
opinions, albeit with a certain reluctance. Appellate judges generally dislike
writing dissenting opinions.24 "Instead of having to prepare and file a dissent,
they would much prefer to join the majority and thus be on the prevailing side
of an appeal. '25 But, in the name of conscience and in the interests of justice,
American appellate judges continue to write dissenting opinions, parting
company with a majority of their colleagues in particular cases.
B. Specific Motivations for Dissenting Opinions
Given the work entailed in writing a dissenting opinion-on top of an
appellate judge's allocation of her fair pro rata share of opinions for a
court 26 -and the increased, and usually unwanted, intellectual and media
attention that attends appellate cases with dissenting opinions, 7 why do judges
file dissenting opinions? Justice Antonin Scalia has provided one good reason,
namely that it allows an appellate judge to engage in self-expression. As he puts
it:
22. Id. at 405 (quoting THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 246-52, 256 (Paul L.
Ford ed., 1904) (a letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Johnson, Oct. 27, 1822)).
23. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
24. Roger G. Flanders, Jr., The Utility of Separate Judicial Opinions in Appellate
Courts of Last Resort: Why Dissents Are Valuable, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 401,
401 (1999).
25. Id.




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/7
JUDICIAL DISSENT
To be able to write an opinion solely for oneself, without the need to
accommodate, to any degree whatever, the more-or-less-differing
views of one's colleagues; to address precisely the points of law that
one considers important and no others; to express precisely the degree
of quibble, or foreboding, or disbelief, or indignation that one believes
the majority's disposition should engender-that is indeed an
unparalleled pleasure.2"
Another prominent reason given for an appellate judge to craft a dissenting
opinion is to advance the truth. Truthfulness is ameliorated by a dissenting
opinion because, when juxtaposed with the majority opinion in a case, a reader
is able to comprehend "exactly who disagrees with what and why there is
disagreement as well as the extent and depth of that disagreement." '29 At least a
dozen other reason have been articulated for why appellate judges bother to write
dissenting opinions:
1. Competition. Writing a dissenting opinion allows an appellate judge to offer
competing, sometimes novel, solutions and approaches to legal problems, and,
therefore, to compete in the intellectual marketplace with other judges, law
professors and legislators.3"
2. Raising the Bar. "Vigorous written debate of the issues in a separate
appellate opinion can also serve to improve the majority's final work product by
forcing the prevailing side to deal with. . . the toughest objections that can be
raised to its position as urged by the losing side and/or by the dissenting
opinion."'"
28. Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 1994 J. Sup. CT. HIST. 33, 42; see also
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, AMERICA CHALLENGED 4 (1960) ("The right to dissent is the only
thing that makes life tolerable for a judge of an appellate court.").
29. Flanders, supra note 24, at 406. A related truthfulness benefit of a dissenting
opinion is:
[I]t unmasks the false appearance of unanimity on [a] court .... If dissents
are discouraged or routinely buried in the interests of presenting a united
judicial front of "monolithic solidarity," then cases that are really decided by
less than unanimous agreement-indeed, even by only a one-judge
margin-will appear to the unsuspecting litigants, lawyers, and public as
unanimous when in fact the court is divided in its legal judgment.
Id.
30. Id. at 407.
31. Id. at 408. In this regard, dissenting opinions may "cause the majority to hone
and tighten its analysis, to omit those arguments that are most vulnerable to objections,
to recast loose language ... and to acknowledge some important limitations on the scope
of its holding." Id. Occasionally, the cogency and logical forcefulness of a draft
dissenting opinion can persuade other appellate judges to join the dissenting opinion and,
under the most favorable circumstances, gather enough support to become a majority
opinion. Id. at 408-09.
2004]
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3. Speaking to the Future. A judge can appeal to future appellate judges to
adopt the reasoning of the dissenter. As expressed by Chief Justice Charles
Evans Hughes: "A dissent ... is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to
the intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly correct the
error into which the dissenting judge believes the court to have been betrayed."32
4. Creative Outlet. Writing a dissenting opinion affords a judge an opportunity
to engage in unfettered creativity. Chief Justice William Rehnquist's dissent in
Texas v. Johnson33-the American flag burning case--is illustrative: in his
"blistering" opinion, hailing the American flag, he quoted excerpts of patriotic
poems, including Ralph Waldo Emerson's "Concord Hymn" and John Greenleaf
Whittier's "Barbara Frietchie."34 Former Indiana Supreme Court Justice Roger
0. DeBruler's dissent in a criminal case, where he cited the Indiana State Poem,
is another example of unrestricted creativity.3"
5. Moral Compunction. Some dissenting opinions are motivated by an intensely
personal, individualistic viewpoint, based on deep moral compunction. Justice
Brennan's repeated dissents in every case before the United States Supreme
Court involving the death penalty illustrate this motivation. Brennan continued
to assert, in successive dissenting opinions, that the death penalty was a per se
violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment. 3
6
32. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 68
(1928); see also William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427,
430-31 (1986), who opined that a dissenting opinion is "offered as a corrective-in the
hope that the Court will mend the error of its ways in a later case" while "seek[ing] to
sow seeds for future harvest." For an analysis of Justice Brennan's dissenting opinions
and philosophy on dissenting, see Rory K. Little, Reading Justice Brennan: Is There a
"Right "to Dissent?, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 683 (1999); Laura Krugman Ray, Justice Brennan
and the Jurisprudence of Dissent, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 307 (1988); cf Anita S.
Krishnakumar, On the Evolution of the Canonical Dissent, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 781,782
(2000) (discussing the emergence of a "constitutional canon of highly authoritative uber-
texts that hold a privileged place in American law," including "a handful of judicial
dissents, originally penned to record the losing, minority viewpoint-that since not only
have shaken off the stigma of the losing position but have come to command a
constitutional stature far superior to that accorded most majority opinions in other
cases").
33. 491 U.S. 397, 421 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
34. JOHNE.NOWAK&RONALDD.ROTUNDA, CoNSTrrUTIONALLAW 1257n.30(6th
ed. 2000).
35. Williams v. State, 256 N.E.2d 913, 918 (Ind. 1970) (DeBruler, J., dissenting)
(citing Act of Mar. 11, 1963, ch. 220, § 1 (codified at IND. CODE § 1-2-5-1 (1993)).
36. Brennan, supra note 32, at 436; cf Kenneth M. Stroud, Justice DeBruler and
the Dissenting Opinion, 30 IND. L. REV. 15,32-34 (1997) (contrasting Indiana Supreme
Court Justice DeBruler's taking a "different approach" with that of United States
Supreme Court Justice William Brennan's approach "when the cause is lost"). In death
[Vol. 69
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6. Political Agitation. A dissenting opinion could theoretically advance a
radical judge's conception of what Professor Jules Lobel terms "Litigation as
Political Agitation, ' 37 wherein "[t]he tactic of framing radical demands in terms
of established rights in order to inspire political action has a long history."'38 If
the appellate judge expressly articulates this reason. for filing a dissenting
opinion, others may view it as illegitimate. As Lobel explained:
Some courts have questioned whether litigation brought for the
purpose of provoking public dialogue and debate is legitimate. For
example, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals imposed Rule 11
sanctions on the attorneys for fifty-five Libyan citizens and residents
who sued for damages resulting from the 1986 United States air strike
on Libya. Although the district court found that plaintiffs' counsel
"surely knew" that "the case offered no hope whatsoever of success,"
and that it had been "brought as a public statement of protest" against
President Reagan's actions, it declined to impose Rule 11 sanctions
because federal courts "serve in some respects as a forum for making
such statements, and should continue to do so." The court of appeals,
however, held that Rule 11 sanctions were warranted because "[w]e
do not conceive it a proper function of a federal court to serve as a
forum for 'protests." 39
7. Psychological Release. Writing a dissenting opinion may provide a
psychological release-what Professor Scott C. Idleman calls "a necessary
cathartic mechanism for judges."'0 Idleman explicates the cathartic function of
dissenting opinions as follows:
Despite their trappings and mystique, judges are human beings, not
machines, and the institutional psychology of the bench may often
penalty cases, Justice DeBruler dissented "based on specific legal defects in the
proceeding," but "after it became clear that the [Indiana Supreme Court] was not going
to adopt his position, DeBruler cast his first vote to affirm a death sentence, thus
abandoning [on grounds of stare decisis] his [earlier] position that every death sentence
was per se unconstitutional." Id.
37. Jules Lobel, Losers, Fools and Prophets: Justice as Struggle, 80 CoRNELL L.
REv. 1331, 1344(1995).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1345 (footnote omitted) (alteration in original). For scholarly criticism
of this view, see Anthony D'Amato, Comment, The Imposition ofAttorney Sanctions for
Claims Arising From the U.S. A ir Raid on Libya, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 705 (1990), and Carl
Tobias, Rule )) Recalibrated in CivilRights Cases, 36 VILL. L. REV. 105, 118-19 (1991).
40. Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV.
1307, 1367 (1995) (footnote omitted).
2004)
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compel individual judges to speak their minds on issues, or in ways,
that may not be obviously necessary to a legal resolution of the case at
hand. Of course, a conservative view of judicial decisionmaking
would likely look unfavorably upon these judicial expressions,
deeming them superfluous dicta or merely the personal opinions of
judges. To the extent that we value the phenomenon of judicial
catharsis, however, we would presumably be more disposed to adopt
a policy of full candor as a means of encouraging both its frequency
and its depth.
The most likely, and perhaps ideal, medium for catharsis is the
dissenting opinion, for it is the official forum in which dissatisfied,
sometimes embittered judges have full control over the strength and
substance of their words (though not necessarily over the potency of
their sentiments). The dissent . .. is much like an act of civil
disobedience: it is "protestual, propositional, stipulative, and
suggestive in appealing to the authority of conscience."'
Professor Idleman illustrates the cathartic function of judicial dissents by
reference to two dissenting opinions by the late United States Supreme Court
Justice Harry Blackmun: (1) DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of
Social Services," in which the Court held that a state had no constitutional duty
to thwart a parent's physical abuse of his child, even if state officials had
knowledge of the probability of such wrongdoing, and (2) Callins v. Collins,"3
a Court decision which denied certiorari to a death row inmate. In his dissenting
opinion in DeShaney, Justice Blackmun emoted:
Poor Joshua! Victim of repeated attacks by an irresponsible,
bullying, cowardly, and intemperate father, and abandoned by
respondent [the state agency] who placed him in a dangerous
predicament and who knew or learned what was going on, and yet did
essentially nothing except, as the Court revealingly observes, ...
"dutifully recorded these incidents in [their] files." It is a sad
commentary upon American life, and constitutional principles--so full
of late of patriotic fervor and proud proclamations about "liberty and
justice for all,"-that this child, Joshua DeShaney, now is assigned to
live out the remainder of his life profoundly retarded.M
41. Id. at 1367-68 (quoting J. Louis Campbell, The Spirit of Dissent, 66
JUDICATURE 304, 307 (1983)) (footnotes omitted).
42. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
43. 510 U.S. 1141 (1994).
44. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also Idleman, supra
note 40, at 1368-69.
[Vol. 69
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In his dissent from the Court's denial of certiorari in Callins-a dissenting
opinion in which, as explained by Professor Idleman, Justice Blackmun
"ultimately declared his change of mind on the constitutionality of
executions" 4 -Blackmun opined:
On February 23, 1994, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Bruce Edwin
Callins will be executed by the State of Texas. Intravenous tubes
attached to his arms will carry the instrument of death, a toxic fluid
designed specifically for the purpose of killing human beings. The
witnesses, standing a few feet away, will behold Callins, no longer a
defendant, an appellant, or a petitioner, but a man, strapped to a
gurney, and seconds away from extinction.
Within days, or perhaps hours, the memory of Callins will begin
to fade. The wheels of justice will chum again, and somewhere,
another jury or another judge will have the unenviable task of
determining whether some human being is to live or die.'
8. Abuse. Another motivation for filing a dissenting opinion is to attack or
disparage the jurists in the majority. Although unhelpful, unconvincing and
unedifying,47 this reason for writing a dissent is nevertheless an "increasingly
common manifestation of excessive judicial [behavior]," as Judge Posner
45. Id. at 1369.
46. Id. (quoting Callins, 510 U.S. at 1143 (Blacknun, J., dissenting)). In
examining the significance of Blackmun's two dissents, Professor Idleman observed:
Needless to say, these passages in DeShaney and Callins are only
marginally related to a "legal" resolution of their respective cases, and
certainly they are of little or no precedential value. Nor do they obviously or
significantly further any of the major rationales for candor .
-accountability, limited discretion, improved quality of decisionmaking, and
guidance to the legal community. Nevertheless, each was doubtless important
to Justice Blackmun (who announced his retirement less than two months
after his Callins dissent), and one can imagine that he would have felt
judicially unfulfilled had he been unable to speak these words as fully and
freely as he did. Yet, if candor were not understood to be some sort of norm,
let alone some sort of obligation, then Justice Blackmun might not have felt
as able to utter these words or to convey these emotions. In turn, we as
readers would not have had the opportunity, through Justice Blacknun's
cathartic moment, to experience the intangible dimensions of (in the case of
Callins) an otherwise run-of-the-mill denial of certiorari. And if none of this
sounds like legal analysis, perhaps that is precisely the beauty of this rationale
for candor-that it serves to infuse judicial opinion writing with the
unprocessed reality of the human condition.
Id. at 1369-70 (footnotes omitted).
47. RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRIsI AND REFORM 232(1985).
2004]
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acknowledged in his 1985 book The Federal Courts.48  Use of dissenting
opinions for
[g]ratuitous deprecations and ad hominen remarks, such as calling a
fellow judge a "schmuck" or a "stealthy assassin"--displaying the
occasional "vanity, irascibility, narrowness, arrogance, and other
weaknesses to which human flesh is heir"-are institutionally
irresponsible, causing readers to be distracted and to think less of
either the abusive author or the court as a whole.49
On the other hand, as Judge Posner observes, "[s]ince feelings do run high in
some cases, the abusive dissent-at least the abusive dissent that conveys the
judge's real emotions-is, if inexcusable, at least understandable.""0
9. Representation of the Minority. As illustrated by the judicial legacy of the
late United States Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall, a judge may be
spurred to author a dissenting opinion in order to pay homage to people who are
neglected, misunderstood or politically weak.5 In Justice Marshall's dissenting
opinions, for example, he expressed concern for, among others, "the poor, the
elderly and prisoners."52 Indeed, "[m]any [of Justice Marshall's] dissents were
in the areas of racial discrimination and criminal law, and [he] frequently showed
concern regarding the states' power over individuals.""3
48. Id.
49. Idleman, supra note 40, at 1392 (footnotes omitted).
50. POSNER, supra note 47, at 234. William Donarski makes an important
distinction between the "power" of an emotional dissent, on the one hand, and a "level
of personal involvement" in a dissenting opinion which makes it too subjective and "in
turn undermines its effectiveness," on the other hand. WILLIAM DOMNARSKI, IN THE
OPINION OF THE COuRT 74 (1996). Domnarski provides an insightful comparison between
Justice Blackmun's "subjective" dissenting opinions and the late Chief Justice William
Burger's "bland" style of majority opinions. Id. Recalling what he termed "great
writers" of judicial opinions like Justices Hugo Black and Robert Jackson, Domnarski
opines:
Whether the current bland style continues to dominate [United States Supreme
Court opinions], or whether we will see a return to the emotional or the
vitriolic is, of course, a function of the evolving Court's membership. It is
possible that there will be in the future great writers on the bench to rival
giants such as Jackson and Black, who were able to combine vision and
language. The chances, though, are that we will not see their likes again.
Id.
51. Karen Gross, Justice Thurgood Marshall's Bankruptcy Jurisprudence: A
Tribute, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 447,451 (1993).
52. Id.
53. Id. Professor Gross cites dissenting opinions by Justice Marshall as illustrative
of his concern for these people and issues, including Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98,
[Vol. 69
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10. Foreshadowing. An appellate judge may choose to write a dissenting
opinion in an effort to give "lower courts, the parties, and interested bystanders"
a guide to "the dynamic 'meaning' of a decision" 4 by the appellate court, and
how that judge will interpret particular precedent in the future."
11. Mental Honing. Writing a series of dissenting opinions in a specific
doctrinal area of the law, say, for example, obscenity jurisprudence, may allow
an appellate judge to refine and perfect his or her disagreements with the
majority's approach."'
12. Accountability. A judge may utilize a dissenting opinion to hold his or her
colleagues "accountable for their decisions.""7
In a sense, all of the various reasons could be organized according to
Jefferson's objection to the monolithic opinion-a dissenting judge seeks to
undertake the writing of a dissenting opinion to avoid being "lazy," "modest,"
and "incompetent."
C. Modern American Dissenting Opinion Style:
Some Preliminary Observations
How might one begin to explain, both descriptively and normatively,
modem dissenting opinion style? For starters, we can assume, for purposes of
discussion, that by "modem" we mean from 1950 onward. If one were interested
in tracing the historical origin of dissenting opinion style in America (which I
am not), one would have to go back to the old English common law practice of
appellate judges issuing separate opinions.58 Then, one would want to examine
the manner of state and federal appellate court dissenting opinions written during
the first decade or so of the nation's history. This would need to be followed by
historically probing the particular reasons why Chief Justice John Marshall
initiated a custom on the United States Supreme Court of abandoning dissenting
114-21 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing defendants' rights), and Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 781-82 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing
desegregation). Gross, supra note 51, at 477 n.37. Justice Marshall also expressed
outrage in dissenting opinions on bankruptcy law. See, e.g., id. at 461 (discussing debt
dischargability issues in Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 53-59 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)).
54. Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many:
Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1,9 (1993).
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Rodney A. Grunes, Justice Brennan and the Problem of Obscenity,
22 SETON HALL L. REv. 789 (1992).
57. Ugo Mattei, Why the Wind Changed.. Intellectual Leadership in Western Law,
42 AM. J. COMP. L. 195, 206 (1994).
58. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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opinions. 9 Such a historical study of dissenting opinion style in America would
need to analyze the various approaches of nineteenth century state and federal
appellate court judges in disagreeing with their colleagues, the kinds of language
used to express dissent, and the relative effectiveness and resonance of particular
dissenting opinions (measured, perhaps, by another court's eventual adoption of
a dissenting opinion).60 This historical account of dissenting opinion style would
look at similar factors present in the dissents of twentieth and twenty-first
century state and federal appellate courtjudges. If we were interested in limning
the intellectual origin of dissenting opinion style in America (which I am not),
one would have to identify various schools of thought about the role of
dissenting opinions over time and disparate views by leading jurists and lawyers
on how dissents should be written." If one were interested in determining the
psychological or social origin of dissenting opinion style in America (which I am
not), one would have to analyze how, during various timeframes, various
dissenting opinion styles arose in response to certain group or individual
needs--say, of litigants, lawyers and judges.6 2
Rather than a historical, an intellectual, or a psycho-social theory of the
origin and development of various modem American dissenting opinion styles,
I am interested in what might be called an aesthetic theory of dissenting opinion
style. Given general American linguistic conventions and literary sensibilities
over the last fifty years, what dissenting opinions have had power, smoothness,
felicitousness, allure and panache? What dissenting opinions have lacked these
stylistic qualities? Why? I begin to search for such an aesthetic theory of
dissenting judicial style by examining the stylistic characteristics of Judge
Posner's first decade of dissenting opinions.
One of the attractions of focusing on Judge Posner's dissenting opinion
style is that he has theorized on the general subject of judicial opinion style
himself. As he writes in the revised and enlarged edition of his book, Law and
Literature:
When defined as choice among the various options for encoding the
paraphrasable content of a writing, style is the smooth capsule or the
flavor additive that makes the medicine easier to swallow and hold
down-or that makes some readers want to throw up. But it is also the
59. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
60. Cf DANIEL L. PALS, SEVEN THEORIES OF RELIGION 12-13 (1996) (discussing
similar historical origin factors involved with theories of religion).
61. Cf id. at 13 (discussing similar intellectual origin factors involved with theories
of religion). For a concise intellectual history of the role of Supreme Court dissenting
opinions, see Ray, supra note 32, at 308-14.
62. Cf PALS, supra note 60, at 12-13 (discussing similar psychological or social
origin approaches involved with theories of religion).
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earmark of "good" writing (that is, not "just rhetoric"), whether or not
the writing has any persuasive purpose other than to keep the reader
reading to the end. One judicial opinion might be better than another
not because the argument was more persuasive but because by
candidly disclosing the facts and authorities tugging against its result,
by being tentative and concessive in tone, even by confessing doubt
about the soundness of its result, it was a more credible, a more
impressive judicial document, though not a more convincing defense
of the outcome.63
Posner goes on to describe judicial opinion style in terms of vividness and
memorableness. He writes:
Writings count as literature when they are detachable from the specific
setting in which they were created. Style is one of the features of
written expression that facilitates this portability; for style is often less
local, less time- and place-bound, than content (though sometimes
more-style can be an impediment to understanding). Rhyme and
meter, the most musical features of poetry, have an appeal that, being
nonverbal, is not tied to the local culture out of which the poetry
emerged. We might have lost interest in a particular legal issue
discussed in a judicial opinion yet the style of the opinion may make
us want to read it anyway; and then the opinion will have outlived the
occasion of its creation."
Posner sees powerful, vivid style in a host of literary examples-from a poem by
Yeats, to extracts from Homer's Illiad and Odyssey, to Antony's speech in
Shakespeare's Julius Caesar, to Philip Roth's novel Operation Shylock."
William Domnarski's seminal 1996 book, In the Opinion of the Court,6 6 is
probably the most comprehensive study of what I call general appellate judicial
opinion style. Two of the book's six chapters focus on style: one chapter is
63. RIcHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LrrERATURE 256 (rev. & enlarged ed. 1998).
64. Id. at 257. Posner observes:
The effect of style on portability is a factor in judicial reputations. Even
a brilliant analysis of yesterday's legal problems is unlikely to hold much
current interest, especially since a major effort at historical reconstruction may
be required to determine that it was brilliant. The vivid and therefore
memorable opinion is not chained to the immediate context of its creation.
It can be pulled out and made to exemplify law's abiding concerns.
Id. at 257-58.
65. Id. at 258-66. For Posner's specific comments about one feature of dissenting
judicial style in recent years, see POSNER, supra note 47, at 232-34.
66. DOMNARSKI, supra note 50.
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entitled "Style and Substance in Supreme Court Opinions"; the other is entitled
"Style and Substance in Lower Federal Court Opinions. ''67 Moreover, the final
chapter of his book is entitled "Closing the Circle: Judge Richard A. Posner and
Exploration of the Judicial Opinion";" the chapter makes important
contributions to understanding the general appellate opinion style of Judge
Posner but does not discuss Posner's dissents. 69
Thus, this Article asks: What attributes of a dissenting opinion give it, in
theory, power, panache, allure, vividness and a memorable quality?" Are these
attributes similar to the attributes of a majority opinion, or a separate concurring
opinion? What about a partial dissenting and partial concurring opinion? In
Law and Literature Posner assumes, without saying why, that good judicial
opinion style is generic regardless of its relationship to the majority view. In this
regard, Posner concludes that Justice Holmes' dissenting opinion in Lochner v.
New York"' is "right [at] the top."7" In spite of Posner's observation that
Holmes' dissent is "not well reasoned,"" he concludes that "it is merely the
greatest judicial opinion of the last hundred years." '74 He praises Holmes'
dissenting opinion in Lochner because it advances "practical reason"-a quality
"[b]etween the extremes of logical persuasion and emotive persuasion"T-and
because it includes certain memorable characteristics: "appeals to common
sense, to custom, to precedents and other authorities, to tradition, to empiricism,
to intuition, to institutional considerations, to history, to consequences, to the
social sciences, to our just or good emotions, and to the 'test of time."' 76
Elsewhere, however, Posner cautions that frequent dissents are bad form. In
Cardozo: A Study in Reputation, Posner observes, "Every dissent is an irritant
to the members of the majority; hence a judge who dissents at the drop of a hat
jeopardizes the esteem of his colleagues." In criticizing the famous dissenting
opinion of New York Court of Appeals Judge William Andrews in Palsgrafv.
LonglslandRailroad Co.7 8-which Posner terms "inept" 79-he contends that the
67. Id. at 55-74, 90-115.
68. Id. at 116-55.
69. But see, e.g., id. at 125, 127, 128-29, 135, 149, 154 (discussing the style of a
few of Judge Posner's dissenting opinions).
70. For a synthesis of existing scholarship on general judicial opinion style, see
Blomquist, supra note 1, at 656-83.
71. 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
72. POSNER, supra note 63, at 266.
73. Id. at 267 (footnote omitted).
74. Id. at 271.
75. Id. at 272.
76. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 120-21 (1990).
78. 162 N.E. 99, 101-05 (1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting).
79. POSNER, supra note 77, at 45.
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opinion "cedes the legal high ground to [the] Cardozo [majority opinion]," and
"fails to land a heavy blow on the majority opinion [thereby] strengthen[ing] that
opinion by making it seem invulnerable.""0 Here, Posner hints that the dissenting
opinion must be held to a higher standard because it risks backfiring on the
writer.
Surprisingly, other than Posner's assorted ruminations,8 Domnarski's
occasional comments on the topic, 82 and Professor Martha Nussbaum's isolated
oblique references to judicial dissents which embody "sympathetic attention to
the special plight of people who are socially unequal," ' little has been written
about the theory of dissenting opinion style.8" Laura Krugman Ray's 1988
article, Justice Brennan and the Jurisprudence of Dissent," contains a helpful
academic discussion of dissenting opinion style. In a section entitled "The Style
of Dissent,""6 Ray observes that an appellate judge "writing in dissent has the
license to speak with a more distinctive voice than the author of a majority
opinion."87 She argues that a dissenting opinion should "only rarely... express
... views in language that exceeds the boundaries of the.., legal prose" of
majority judicial opinions." Ray generally limits her discussion to the stylistic
qualities of Justice William Brennan's dissenting opinions. 9 Building on some
of Ray's insights, Professor John Leubsdorf's 2001 article entitled The Structure
ofJudicial Opinions" is an excellent theoretical discussion of dissenting opinion
style. However, because Leubsdorf is concerned about judicial opinions in
general, he provides only limited theoretical consideration ofdissenting opinions.
80. Id. at 46.
81. See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
83. Blomquist, supra note 1, at 672 (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing
Nussbaum's review of a dissenting opinion by United States Supreme Court Justice John
Paul Stevens in a prisoners' rights case).
84. In my article on Judge Posner's judicial opinion style on the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit during his first year on the bench (1981-82), I devote a
few pages to discussing his dissenting opinion style during that "rookie" year. See id. at
727-31, 734.
85. Ray, supra note 32.
86. Id. at 346-50.
87. Id. at 346.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 346-50 (discussing Justice Brennan's dissenting opinions with attention
to use of figurative language, metaphors, literary allusions, "works of literature in which
the rational becomes irrational, the decent becomes oppressive," "whimsical humor,"
tone, rhetoric and imagery). Ray concluded that the style of Justice Brennan's dissenting
opinions can be thought of as "a barometer of his judicial discontent." Id. at 350.
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Nevertheless, what Leubsdorf says about the theory of dissenting opinion style,
or what his theory implies, is provocative. In this regard, he first observes the
different "voice" that a dissenting opinion shares with other "voices" found in
judicial opinions:
Many voices, heard more or less directly, may tell or discuss
. . . stories: the author of the [majority] opinion, concurrers and
dissenters, trial judges, judges who wrote in other cases, legislatures
and legislators, lawyers, and sometimes even litigants and witnesses.
It would be a wild overstatement to describe the typical judicial
opinion, as [one critic] describes Dostoevsky's novels, as a "plurality
of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses, a genuine
polyphony of fully valid voices." Often, indeed, the opinion's author
succeeds in swallowing other voices, which can be heard, if at all, only
like the duck quacking from the wolf's stomach in another Russian
work, Peter and the Wolf. Still, a judicial opinion offers real
opportunities for dialogue.9'
In Leubsdorf's view, it is the dissenting opinion that provides that dramatic
dialogue. A second insight about judicial opinions in general that has special
resonance in understanding the need for a different judicial voice in a dissenting
opinion is as follows:
The characters who appear in judicial opinions are more like
those in fables, epics and newspaper articles than they are like the
characters of Henry James of Dostoevsky. The limited information
available about them, the tendency of lawyers and judges to think
about litigants in familiar and therefore plausible stereotypes, the drive
to justify the decision by justifying or condemning a party's acts, and
the hope that decisions will establish models for future behavior lead
to the prevalence of two-dimensional figures. That would scarcely
surprise novelists who, for both artistic and competitive reasons,
delight to show how the judicial process fails to perceive the complex
truth about individuals.92
This analysis overlaps Nussbaum's notion that the dissent fleshes out the
total truth of a situation, illuminating the characters and ideas that the majority
marginalized.
91. Id. at 448 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 461-62 (footnotes omitted).
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Third, Leubsdorf also notes the historical valence of dissents that tell "law
stories." 3 As is the case regarding character elucidation,94 telling "stories about
how law has changed over time,""5 often by reference to legislation,96 can be of
particular theoretical importance in fashioning a dissenting opinion. For
example, a dissenting opinion might "portray[] the passage of legislation: the
problems that gave rise to it, proposals for resolving those problems, and the
legislature's decision."'97 Moreover, a dissenting opinion is often fertile ground
to tell "a story of decline, in which a mistaken decision has involved the law in
increasing confusion or folly." ' Indeed, "[s]ometimes it is not too late to undo
the mistake, so that the story has a happy ending after all, at least in the view of
its author,'" as exemplified by Justice Louis Brandeis' dissenting opinion in
Louis K Ligget Co. v. Lee.'00 But, sometimes, a dissenting opinion will portray
the mistake of the majority in a tone of unbridled bitterness when the "opinion
tells a story that is a prediction of the dire results the majority's decision will
produce,"'0 ' if not corrected, as Justice McReynolds's dissenting opinion in
Perry v. United States illustrates.'o2 A dissenting opinion telling law stories can
usefully rely upon "judges of times past, returning in a variety of cameo roles."'0 3
Thus, as a judge of the Missouri Supreme Court did in a 1983 dissent,' "[t]he
opinion may... summon up the ghost of Holmes to warn against repeating the
errors ofhis own day."' 0 ' Such evocations are familiar and crowd-pleasing since
93. Id. at 473 n. 111 (noting that this phrase is "stolen" from the book LAW STORIES
(Gary Bellow & Martha Minow eds., 1996)).
94. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
95. Leubsdorf, supra note 90, at 473.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 475.
99. Id.
100. 288 U.S. 517,548-62 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Leubsdorf, supra note
90, at 475 n. 121 ("describing the development of large corporations and the law's failure
to control their dangers").
101. Leubsdorf, supra note 90, at 475. The result, according to Leubsdorf, is often
"a tone of bitter satire not uncommon in literary portrayals of the law," like the tone of
Dickens, "but rare in judicial opinions, whose authors do not like to admit in public that
the law suffers from imperfections they cannot or will not cure." Id.
102. 294 U.S. 330, 381 (1935) (McReynolds, J., dissenting) ("Loss of reputation
for honorable dealing will bring us unending humiliation; the impending legal and moral
chaos is appalling."); Leubsdorf, supra note 90, at 475 n.124.
103. Leubsdorf, supra note 90, at 477.
104. State v. Goddard, 649 S.W.2d 882, 892 (Mo. 1983) (Welliver, J., dissenting)
(relying on Holmes). This example is made by Leubsdorf, supra note 90, at 477 n.133.
105. Leubsdorf, supra note 90, at 477.
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famous judges of Anglo-American history "are stock characters that the audience
knows and loves from previous encounters." ' 6
Leubsdorf caps his theory that opinions function as stories, satisfying
literary appetites, by analogizing a dissent (or a concurrence for that matter) to
a novel with several narrators," 7 a technique used in works by Virginia Woolf
and William Faulkner.' Accordingly, a "crafty reader"'0 9 can use a dissenting
opinion "to improve his understanding of the facts, issues, or arguments." ' 10 The
dissenting opinion might show, as Justice Stephen Breyer's partial dissent in
Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. NLRB"' arguably shows, "that a[]
[majority] appellate opinion has swept under the rug problems it should have
faced."' " In working toward a theory of modem appellate dissenting opinion
style, Professor Leubsdorf's discussion of the differing "voices" of the law
provides us with what we might call "perspectivism": "3 an understanding that
law is "a question of orientation, framing, and context."'""
If Leubsdorf's work focuses on the judge speaking to posterity by imbuing
his opinions with belletristic qualities, the latest authoritative law review
commentary about appellate dissenting opinion style, by Professor Charles Fried,
thinks of a style strictly in terms of a judge's relationship with the rest of the
bench. Fried's commentary, Five to Four: Reflections on the School Voucher
Case, discusses a theory of oppositional and collaborative dissenting opinions. "'
Starting with a pastiche of"stunning exchange[s]" between justices of the United
States Supreme Court in recent dissenting and concurring opinions, "" Fried goes
on to articulate "Two Kinds of Dissent""' 7 by members of the Court:
106. Id. at 477-78.
107. Id. at 491.
108. E.g., WILLIAM FAULKNER, As I LAY DYiNG (1931); VIRGINIA WOOLF, THE
WAVES (193 1). These examples are provided by Leubsdorf, supra note 90, at 491 n. 192.
109. This phrase is taken from the title of the book, ROBERT SCHOLES, THE CRAFTY
READER (2001). Scholes argues: "One becomes a crafty reader by learning the craft of
reading. I believe that it is in our interest as individuals to become crafty readers, and in
the interest of the nation to educate citizens in the craft of reading." Id. at xiii.
110. Leubsdorf, supra note 90, at 491.
111. 522 U.S. 359, 392-97 (1998) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). This example is provided by Leubsdorf, supra note 90, at 491 n.194.
112. Leubsdorf, supra note 90, at 491.
113. Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047,
1081 (2002).
114. Id. at 1117.
115. Charles Fried, Five to Four: Reflections on the School Voucher Case, 116
HARv. L. REV. 163 (2002).
116. See, e.g., id. at 175-76 n.61, 177.
117. Id. at 180.
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"collaborative" and "oppositional.""'  Fried's analytical categories are both
functional and aesthetic because they describe the varying purposes of justices
in employing particular dissenting opinions as well as the different styles justices
exhibit with particular dissenting opinions. While formally limited to explaining
dissenting opinions by Supreme Court justices, Fried's analysis contributes to a
broader understanding of dissenting opinion styles on all appellate
courts-perhaps with special relevance to state supreme courts. Fried suggests
that, when in a collaborative mood, judges see the common law as a discernible
"way" that they must walk together. As he puts it, "The dissent, then, knowing
full well that common law development is notoriously path-dependent, sees the
majority as wandering off from a shared path, and warns where such a divagation
may ultimately lead.""..9
The collaborative dissent, in Fried's view, "is a close relative to the
concurrence, a device that Justices O'Connor and Scalia have used to great
advantage in several areas."' 20 In contradistinction to this kind of collaborative
dissent, Fried describes the oppositional dissent as "reject[ing] the majority's
opinion as a basis for further development of the law."'' Staying with his
navigational metaphor, Fried writes that the appellate judge deploying an
oppositional dissenting opinion
would take the law right back to where it was before the wrong turn
and implies that the dissenter will not accept the decision even
grudgingly as a premise for reasoning--even if that reasoning might
not carry the doctrine even further in the wrong direction. The
oppositional dissent, then, is a potential vote for overruling and thus
implies a refusal to allow the decision to shelter under stare decisis.
By committing to an oppositional stance, the dissenter implies she will
overturn precedent when the votes are there. But just as there are
principled considerations warranting a departure from stare decisis,
so-in a minor key-an oppositional dissent, no less than a
collaborative one, is a conscientious participation in the work of the
[appellate court].' 22
118. Id.
119. Id. at 180-81 (footnote omitted).
120. Id. at 181. According to Fried, "[i]n each of its modalities, the collaborative
dissent accords well with the values of stability and continuity that lie behind the doctrine
of stare decisis. Stare decisis requires only loyalty to and collaboration in the
development of doctrine, not loyalty to method." Id. (emphasis added).
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And, interestingly, the Friedian categories of collaborative and oppositional
dissenting opinions "blend into each other" '23 in some instances when an
appellate "judge may not be quite sure whether she is an oppositionist or a
collaborator."' 2 " In such gray areas the dissenting opinion "states objections,.
. sets out markers, and the direction in which the [pertinent] doctrine moves
may determine the direction in which [the judge] moves." 2 To add to the
complexity, "[a]t other times a dissenter may start out as an oppositionist but
over the years move to a collaborative mode or simply give up and join the
majority.' 12 6 In concluding his analysis of Justice Souter's dissenting opinion,
which characterized the majority opinion for the Court in Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris-the school voucher case 27-- as resulting in "doctrinal bankruptcy,' ' 28
Professor Fried compares Souter's dissenting style with that of other justices in
other cases where Fried found the following aesthetic features: "angry bite,"'29
"firmness,"' 30 "aura of condemnation,"' 3 "anomalous,"' 32 "solipsistic' ' 33 "touch
of softness"'13' and "a voice crying in the wilderness.' 13
At this juncture, I will postpone my own theoretical take on dissenting
opinion style until after I have reviewed, characterized and classified-as a case
study of sorts-the aesthetics of Judge Richard A. Posner's dissenting opinions
during his first ten years on the federal appellate bench. 36 Then, based on the
insights derived from the Posner study, I will synthesize existing theories of





127. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
128. Id. at 688 (Souter, J., dissenting).
129. Fried, supra note 115, at 190.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 189.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 190.
135. Id. at 189.
136. See infra notes 138-499 and accompanying text.
137. See infra notes 500-17 and accompanying text.
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HI. JUDGE POSNER'S DISSENTING OPINIONS, 1981-1991:
A STUDY IN EVOLVING CONTRARIAN PANACHE
A. Statistics
During his first twenty years as a United States Court of Appeals
Judge-measured from his starting date during the autumn of 1981... until the
end of 2001 (technically, a bit longer than twenty years)-Judge Richard A.
Posner wrote a total of 1,808 published opinions, or an average of about ninety
opinions per year. Of these 1,808 opinions, Judge Posner wrote 1,679 opinions
for the Seventh Circuit majority. Posner authored a total of 129 published
separate opinions during this timeframe; these separate opinions consisted of
seventy dissenting opinions, forty-seven pure concurring opinions and twelve
mixed concurring/dissenting opinions.'39
138. See Blomquist, supra note 1, at 683-85.
139. My research assistant and I calculated these figures based on a hand count of
all published authored opinions by Judge Posner on the Westlaw federal court Seventh
Circuit database
information:
of published opinions. The following table summarizes this
TABLE 1
Year Maj Con Con/ Diss Total % %
Diss Separate Dissenting
Opinions Opinions
1981 3 0 0 0 3 0.00% 0.00%
1982 77 2 0 6 85 9.41% 7.06%
1983 81 7 3 5 96 15.63% 8.33%
1984 77 4 1 5 87 11.49% 6.90%
1985 88 6 0 9 103 14.56% 8.74%
1986 78 3 1 4 86 9.30% 5.81%
1987 79 4 0 2 85 7.06% 2.35%
1988 72 3 2 3 80 10.00% 6.25%
1989 72 3 0 3 78 7.69% 3.85%
1990 86 3 0 5 94 8.51% 5.32%
1991 73 1 1 4 79 7.59% 6.33%
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The distribution of Judge Posner's eighty-two dissenting opinions and
mixed concurring/dissenting opinions over these twenty years is instructive.
From late 1981 through the end of 1986 he wrote thirty-four dissenting opinions
(41.5 percent of all his dissenting opinions); from 1987 through the end of 1991
he wrote twenty dissenting opinions (24.4 percent of his dissenting opinions);
from 1992 through the end of 1996 he wrote fifteen dissenting opinions (18.3
percent of his dissenting opinions); and from 1997 through the end of 2001 he
wrote thirteen dissenting opinions (15.8 percent of all his dissenting opinions). "
Thus, as Judge Posner's tenure on the bench lengthened he tended to write fewer
dissenting opinions. A possible reason for Posner's decreasing rate and number
of dissenting opinions is his increased satisfaction with Seventh Circuit opinions.
Posner's increased satisfaction, in turn, is probably related to both his own
persuasiveness in convincing his colleagues to adopt his reasoning on assorted
legal issues and to the appointment of more like-minded judges to the Seventh
Circuit (as well as the Supreme Court).
1992 77 1 0 6 84 8.33% 7.14%
1993 98 0 0 3 101 2.97% 2.97%
1994 100 2 0 1 103 2.91% 0.97%
1995 89 2 1 2 94 5.32% 3.19%
1996 103 0 0 2 105 1.90% 1.90%
1997 88 0 1 0 89 1.12% 1.12%
1998 83 1 0 2 86 3.49% 2.33%
1999 90 2 0 5 97 7.21% 5.15%
2000 80 1 1 2 84 4.76% 3.57%
2001 85 2 1 1 89 4.49% 1.12%
Totals 1,679 47 12 70 1,808 7.13% 4.54%
140. Id. My statistics do not reflect whether Judge Posner's dissenting opinions
were dissents from panel majority opinions, dissents from en banc majority opinions,
partial concurring and dissenting opinions, or dissents from majority opinions declining
to rehear a panel opinion en banc. However, in the discussion that follows I do make
these distinctions. See infra notes 141-477 and accompanying text.
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B. The First Five Years, 1981-1986
1. 1981-1982
During the 1981-1982 timeframe (a little over one calendar year from his
commencement of judicial duties in late 1981 through the end of 1982) Judge
Posner wrote five published dissenting opinions from panel opinions and one
dissenting opinion from a Seventh Circuit en banc decision denying a
rehearing."" During this rookie season Posner's dissenting opinions were, in
general, written in a respectful and measured tone, tinged at times with subtle
sarcasm. This style is exemplified in his first-ever dissenting opinion in the
Indianapolis school desegregation case, United States v. Board of School
Commissioners.42 In that case, the dissent argued that the majority opinion
demonstrated a lack of economic and practical sense by getting involved in "the
tangled and recriminatory business" of financing and paying for the court-
ordered busing. 4' Sometimes, however, Posner's dissenting opinions during this
period came off as a bit shrill and self-indulgent-as in Sur v. Glidden-Durkee'"
and McKeever v. Israel.45 The dissenting opinions characteristic of his best
style during his rookie season were in the statutory interpretation cases, United
States v. Anton'" and Allison v. Liberty Savings.4" Anton was an immigration
case involving the interpretation of a federal statute that made it a crime for a
once-deported alien to re-enter the United States "unless ... the Attorney
General has expressly consented to such alien's reapplying for admission.""48
Throughout his dissent, Posner elegantly and persuasively utilized traditional
tools of statutory construction, such as textual analysis, examination of
Congress's purpose in passing the law, the historical evolution and legislative
history of the deportation statute, policy considerations and the force of other
141. See Allison v. Liberty Say., 695 F.2d 1086, 1091 (7th Cir. 1982) (denial of
reh'g en banc) (Posner, J., dissenting); McKeever v. Israel, 689 F.2d 1315, 1324 (7th Cir.
1982) (Posner, J., dissenting); Bhd. of R.R. Signalmen v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,
Co., 688 F.2d 535, 545 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J., dissenting); United States v. Anton,
683 F.2d 1011, 1019 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J., dissenting) overruled by United States
v. Carlos-Colmenares, 253 F.3d 276 (7th Cir. 2001); Sur v. Glidden-Durkee, 681 F.2d
490,499 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J., dissenting); United States v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs,
677 F.2d 1185, 1190 (Posner, J., dissenting) (7th Cir. 1982).
142. Bd. ofSch. Comm 'rs, 677 F.2d at 1190 (Posner, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 1194 (Posner, J., dissenting).
144. Sur, 681 F.2d at 499 (Posner, J., dissenting).
145. McKeever, 689 F.2d at 1324 (Posner, J., dissenting).
146. Anton, 683 F.2d at 1019 (Posner, J., dissenting).
147. Allison, 695 F.2d at 1091 (Posner, J., dissenting).
148. Anton, 683 F.2d at 1012 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2)(A) (1994)).
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courts' interpretations of the statute. 49 Allison was a civil suit by a real estate
borrower against the lender under the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act ("RESPA") for allegedly requiring an excessive escrow deposit. 15 ° The
court denied rehearing en banc. In his dissent, Judge Posner observed in the
rhetoric of law and economics which he savors that "[tihe panel's opinion is not
only lucid and well-reasoned; it reaches an attractive result: it excludes from the
federal courts a host of petty cases.., which do not belong in those courts under
an optimal allocation ofjurisdiction between the state and federal courts."'' In
the next sentence, however, Posner announced his dissent: "Nevertheless, I
disagree with the decision, and believe the case should be reheard en banc."'52
He also observed that "[a]lthough [the alleged statutory violation] is pretty small
beer, the panel's opinion both sets forth an approach potentially of general
application to deciding when federal statutes may be enforced by private damage
actions and creates a conflict with another circuit,"'"3 while also "lend[ing] itself
to en banc treatment, presenting as it does a single issue, purely of law."' 54 The
heart of Posner's dissent is an elegant contrarian meditation on the likely purpose
of Congress in passing the statute and the inadequacy of the remedy offered by
the majority. As Judge Posner phrased the matter:
[W]e must ask: if the Congress that enacted RESPA had adverted to
the question of remedies for violations of Section 10, would it have
decided that there ought to be a private damage remedy?
Section 10 forbids the lender to force the borrower to deposit
money in escrow above a certain amount. The natural remedy for the
violation of such a prohibition is a suit by the borrower to get the
excess deposit returned to him. Congress could not have wanted the
lender to be able to retain the excess deposit in violation of the statute.
True, a private suit is not the only possible remedy. Alternatively, the
borrower could complain to an agency with regulatory authority over
the lender, and that was done in this case. However, the panel opinion
points out that some borrowers may not be able to get any relief by this
route, and this should make us hesitant about concluding that Congress
would not have wanted borrowers to have a right to sue in court.
149. Id. at 1019-21 (Posner, J., dissenting). Indeed, Posner's use of analogy to
probe the possible purposes of Congress in passing the Alien Re-Entry Felony Statute
was striking. See Blomquist, supra note 1, at 728 n.368 (quoting extensively from
dissenting opinion).
150. Allison, 695 F.2d at 1087.
151. Id. at 1091 (Posner, J., dissenting).
152. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
153. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
154. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
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More important, the administrative remedy appears to be
inadequate even for those borrowers who can invoke it. In the present
case, for example, the agency made the defendant return to the
plaintiff the money she had overpaid into the escrow account, but (she
alleges, and we must assume for purposes of this appeal) not the
interest that the defendant had earned on that money. The return ofthe
interest is not some bagatelle, inessential to the adequacy of the
administrative remedy. This is not a personal injury case, where
interest accrues only from the date of the judgment, and not from the
date of the tort itself. It is a suit based on unjust enrichment-a suit
for restitution.... You may not steal a man's pregnant cow and after
it has given birth return the cow and keep the calf. No more should
the defendant in this case be allowed to keep the increase in its wealth
from investing the plaintiff's money .... Yet it may be the only
remedy that this plaintiff has under the decision today.'
2. 1983
During 1983, Judge Posner published a total of eight dissenting opinions.
Specifically, these opinions consisted of five pure dissenting opinions"" and
three mixed concurring/dissenting opinions." 7 In reading through these eight
Posnerian dissents, one is struck by a more confident, more piercing, more
academic tone in comparison to the dissenting opinions Judge Posner wrote
during his rookie season on the federal appellate bench.' More specifically, in
United States v. Knop,"' a criminal bank fraud case, Posner played the role of
the stern taskmaster, convinced that the Justice Department had been adequately
warned about the need to prove by specific evidence that the national bank was
federally insured at the time of the defendant's fraudulent representations.
155. Id. at 1092 (Posner, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
156. See Hayes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 1332, 1336 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner,
J., dissenting); DePass v. United States, 721 F.2d 203, 206 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.,
dissenting); Boyle v. United States, 710 F.2d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.,
dissenting), rev'd, 469 U.S. 241 (1985); Vail v. Bd. of Educ., 706 F.2d 1435, 1449 (7th
Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting), af'd, 466 U.S. 377 (1984); United States v. Knop, 701
F.2d 670, 676 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting).
157. See Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 723 F.2d 1324, 1344 (7th Cir. 1983)
(reh'g en banc) (Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Jackson v. Consol.
Rail Corp., 717 F.2d 1045, 1057 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Merritt v. Faulkner, 697 F.2d 761, 769 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
158. Cf supra notes 141-55 and accompanying text.
159. Knop, 701 F.2d at 676 (Posner, J., dissenting).
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In Vail v. Board of Education of Paris Union School District No. 95, a
constitutional tort case against a school board that terminated a football coach's
two year contract after one year, Judge Posner's style is characterized by an aura
of condemnation-with specific criticism of his colleagues' reasoning-that
surfaces to an angry bite at certain points in the dissenting opinion." Posner
backed up his anger with a scholarly exegesis on the historical distinction
between property rights and contract rights, a textual analysis of the Constitution,
a review of available state law remedies for the coach, occasional economic
pontification, and a close reading of Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit
precedent. While portions of his dissenting opinion in Vail exhibit frankness and
uncertainty, the culmination of the opinion rings with an Old Testament
ominatio,6' when Posner states:
[F]orget [a specific Supreme Court holding], and my basic point
remains: in a case of this sort, where one is about as far away as one
can get from the gross police misconduct alleged in [the seminal
Supreme Court case in this field], the requirements of due process are
satisfied by the remedies that the state provides in its courts for
breaches of contract by its school boards. And this is but one of my
grounds for arguing that Vail has no right of relief under 42 U.S.C. §
1983; the others, it will be recalled, are that there is no property right
at stake in this case and that in any event there has been no deprivation
of such a right. I do not argue that any of these grounds possesses
apodictic certainty but at least they show that the result in this case is
not predestined by existing case law. The Supreme Court has not
decided the question in this case. We do that Court a disservice to
apply its 1972 decisions ... to the very different facts of this case,
ignoring all that has happened in the law relevant to section 1983 since
then, reaching a result that is contrary to every principle of federalism
and good sense, and putting the blame on the Court. I have tried very
hard but without success to think of a reason why a football coach
should be allowed to litigate his contract claim against a school board
in a federal district court. I get no help in this endeavor from being
told by Judge Eschbach that the case is about the "termination of a
person's livelihood," or by Judge Wood that football coaches "are
generally not second class members of a balanced school program."
We are witnessing the trivialization of the Constitution. I regret
almost more than Ican say that my brethren 's method of interpreting
precedent has led them to take another step on the road whose
160. Vail, 706 F.2d at 1449-56 (Posner, J., dissenting).
161. "Ominatio" is "a prophecy of evil." See RICHARD A. LANHAM, A HANDLIST
OF RHETORICAL TERMs 187 (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter RHETORCAL TERMS].
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terminus is the displacement of the whole of state law into the federal
courts. 1
62
Shifting from civil rights law to matters of tax law, in Boyle v. United
States, Posner deployed the rhetorical techniques of meiosis and effictio in
belittling Robert W. Boyle--"the decedent's son and executor of her estate" 63
who faced a penalty for filing a federal estate tax return three months late. Judge
Posner dissented from the panel majority who affirmed the district court's order
to refund the late filing penalty Boyle had paid; Posner sardonically observed
that "Boyle is not J.P. Morgan or Baron Rothschild but he is an experienced
businessman, and not the pathetic receptionist/telephone operator .
inexperienced in business matters" who had received leniency under a prior
Seventh Circuit decision." Reverting to a professorial tone, Posner noted that
his approach in interpreting the pertinent law would create proper "incentives
[that] would . . . avoid a persistent problem in the enforcement of the tax
laws."'' 65 "Instead," Judge Posner claimed, "the court today adopts an approach
that rewards both the active negligence of the lawyer [representing the executor]
and the passive negligence of his client."' 6
Judge Posner, expressing compassion backed up by intellectual acuity,
wrote a marvelous dissenting opinion in DePass v. United States, 67 which is
worthy of extended analysis. He started by employing antanagoge to state an
interestingparadox 16 about the trial court's award of damages to a Federal Tort
162. Vail, 706 F.2d at 1456 (Posner, J., dissenting) (second emphasis added).
163. Boyle v. United States, 710 F.2d 1251, 1256 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.,
dissenting), rev'd, 469 U.S. 241 (1985). "Meiosis" is "belittling, often through a trope
of one word." RHETORICALTERMs,supra note 161, at 189. "Effictio" entails "ahead-to-
toe itemized description of a person." Id. at 185. While Posner did not provide a
physical description of Boyle, his style focuses on a detailed functional description of
Boyle's business acumen. Curiously, while Judge Posner argued that ordinary
negligence-and therefore an objective reasonable person standard-should govern
interpretation of the federal regulation, he seemingly focused on the subjective
competence and background of Boyle in an approach that resembles the defendant's
argument in the discredited classic torts case of Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490
(1837) (where Chief Justice Tindal wrote that to judge liability for negligence based on
the individual intellectual characteristics of each person would result in a standard "as
variable as the length of the foot of each individual").
164. Boyle, 710 F.2d at 1256 (Posner, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
165. Id. at 1258 (Posner, J., dissenting).
166. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
167. 721 F.2d 203, 206 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting).
168. "Antanagoge" consists of "balancing an unfavorable aspect with a favorable
one." RHETORICAL TERMs, supra note 161, at 184. A "paradox" is "a seemingly self-
contradictory statement which yet is shown to be true." Id.
2004]
27
Blomquist: Blomquist: Dissent, Posner-Style:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
MISSOURI LA W RE VIEW
Claims Act plaintiff who was negligently struck by a car driven by an employee
of the United States, suffering, among other injuries, a traumatic amputation of
his left leg below the knee. 69 Judge Posner started his opinion in an
informal-almost chatty-way that engages and disarms the reader:
Although this may seem like a routine personal-injury case, it
raises important questions relating to the use of scientific evidence in
federal trials. The plaintiff, a 37-year-old man named DePass, was hit
by a car owned and operated by the government. He was seriously
injured--one of his legs had to be amputated just below the knee, the
other was crippled, and one eye was badly injured. He brought suit
under the Federal Tort Claims Act and the district court held the
government liable and awarded DePass $800,000 in damages. The
entire award is for "pain and suffering," since DePass incurred no
medical expenses (he received all medical treatment free of charge
from the Veterans Administration) and proved no loss of earnings
from the accident. This is a generous award, maybe too generous,
even though "pain and suffering" does not meanjust physical pain and
suffering but includes the unhappiness caused by disfiguring and
crippling injuries. In any event, the judge's failure to explain the basis
of the award seems inconsistent with the requirements of Rule 52(a)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
But the government has not appealed, so for purposes of this
appeal we must accept that $800,000 is a reasonable estimate of
DePass's damages, assuming as the judge found that DePass's life was
not shortened by the accident. . . . Although the additional loss
inflicted by shortening what is now likely to be a rather miserable life
may be slight in pecuniary terms, especially after being discounted to
present value, if DePass proved that the accident probably shortened
his life he was entitled to some additional damages and it should be no
concern of ours whether the addition would be small or large or
whether as an original matter we might think $800,000 adequate or
even excessive to compensate for all of his losses. 70
169. DePass "brought suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 267 1-
2680. The United States admitted liability, and the case was tried as to damages only."
DePass, 721 F.2d at 203.
170. Id. at 206 (Posner, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Posner's citation to the
0 'Shea case is to a majority opinion that he wrote the year before. See Blomquist, supra
note 1, at 709, 711 (discussing O'Shea opinion as "stylistically beautiful" in a case
involving "the tricky question of how to account for inflation in computing lost future
wages" by "weav[ing] a seamless web of logic and analysis" using stylistic techniques,
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Posner continued his dissenting opinion in DePass by targeting the flaws
in the trial judge's reasoning process. In the passage that follows, the dissenting
opinion exhibits epicrisis,7' as revealed by Posner's quotation of passages from
the trial record and the trial judge's written findings of fact; after this
dissection of the lower court opinion, Posner uses apodioxis"' in his adamant
rejection of the trial judge's flawed conceptions of probabilities as evidence:
[I]t seems... likely from his remarks that the district judge thought
that all probabilities are too uncertain to provide a basis for awarding
damages. Yet most knowledge, and almost all legal evidence, is
probabilistic. Even the proposition that DePass will die someday is
merely empirical. It is of course highly probable that he will die but
it is not certain in the way it is certain that 103 is [not] 1,000 or that I
am my wife's husband-propositions that are true as a matter of
definition rather than of observation. If [there had been] testi[mony]
that DePass had heart disease and was therefore likely to die younger
than most men in his age group, [the expert] would have been making
a probabilistic statement; and the probabilities that are derived from
statistical studies are no less reliable in general than the probabilities
that are derived from direct observation, from intuition, or from case
studies of a single person or event-all familiar sources of legal
evidence.
All this has long been recognized in personal injury cases, as it is
throughout the law. If a tort victim is seriously injured and will
require medical attention for the rest of his life, the court in deciding
how much to award him for future medical expenses will have to
estimate how long he can be expected to live and it will make this
estimate by consulting a mortality table, which is to say by looking at
a statistical summation of the experience of thousands of millions of
people none of whom is a party or a witness in the case, rather than by
studying the lifelines on the victim's palms. And if a study has been
made of the mortality of people with the same kind of injury as the
plaintiff, the court will consult that study in addition to or instead of
standard mortality tables. This is what DePass asked the districtjudge
to do here.'74
171. "Epicrisis" occurs when one "quotes a passage and comments on it."
RHETORICAL TERMS, supra note 161, at 183.
172. See DePass, 721 F.2d at 206-07 (Posner, J., dissenting).
173. "Apodioxis" involves "rejecting an argument indignantly as impertinent or
absurdly false." RHETORICAL TERMS, supra note 161, at 186.
174. DePass, 721 F.2d at 207-08 (Posner, J., dissenting).
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The DePass dissent illuminates the consequences of the decision to the
undercompensated victim and also uncovers the close-mindedness of the district
judge, whom Posner's colleagues affirmed. The style of Posner's dissent
illustrates his ability to convey the underpinnings of events and people's
actions-the motives that lie even beneath economic motives.
Judge Posner ended his DePass dissent with a remarkably acute rumination
on the meaning of the excluded statistical report in the trial court; he alluded to
portions of the statistical study that supported the proposition that amputees
enjoy a diminished probable lifespan;'" he ended with a sweeping tort law and
economics polemic:
[A] judge is not free to say, in my court we do not allow statistical
inference. Knowledge increasingly is statistical, and judges must not
let themselves lag too far behind the progress of knowledge. As a
matter of fact they have not lagged. The kind of evidence that the
district judge rejected in this case, evidence of probability of survival,
invariably based on studies of a group of people rather than ofjust the
individual plaintiff, is an increasingly common basis for awarding
damages.
The district judge's rejection of such evidence, if widely
followed, would lead to systematically undercompensating the victims
of serious accidents and thus to systematically underdeterring such
accidents. Accidents that require the amputation of a limb, particularly
a leg, are apparently even more catastrophic than one had thought.
They do not just cause a lifetime of disfigurement and reduced
mobility; they create a high risk of premature death from heart disease.
The goal of awarding damages in tort law is to put the tort victim as
nearly as possible in the position he would have occupied if the tort
had not been committed. This goal cannot be attained or even
approached if judges shut their eyes to consequences that scientists
have found are likely to follow from particular types of accident[s],
merely because the scientists' evidence is statistical. But unless I have
mistaken the true grounds of the district judge's decision in this case
that is what he did.
The finding that DePass failed to prove a reduction in life
expectancy as a result of the accident should be vacated as clearly
erroneous and the case should be remanded to the district court for a
determination of the amount of damages necessary to compensate
DePass for an 11-year reduction in his life expectancy. 76
175. Id. at 208-09 (Posner, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 209-10 (Posner, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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Judge Posner took a tedious and extended, yet highbrow, deliberatio'77 on
the subject of appellate jurisdiction in his dissenting opinion in Hayes v. Allstate
Insurance Co. ;178 he would have held that the appellate panel lacked jurisdiction
to consider the provisional stay and order for appraisal of a fire insurance
claim. 7
9
Among the three mixed concurring/dissenting opinions that Judge Posner
penned during 1983,180 his opinion in Merritt v. Faulkner8" is the most
aesthetically pleasing,'82 notwithstanding Posner's disagreement with the
majority's more compassionate view that it was an abuse of discretion for the
trial court to deny a state prisoner's request for appointed counsel to wage a civil
constitutional tort suit against prison officials for deliberate indifference in
allowing the prisoner to go blind.'8 3 Posner concurred that "it was an abuse of
discretion for the district judge to deny Merritt's untimely request for ajury trial"
since "[a] prisoner not represented by counsel, even one assisted as here by 'lay
advocates' (also known as 'jailhouse lawyers'), is entitled to every indulgence
in the court's procedural rulings."'" However, Posner disagreed with the
majority "that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court not to appoint
counsel" for the prisoner.'85 Elaborating on the basis of his partial dissent in
177. "Deliberatio" is a technique of argument which involves "evaluating possible
courses of action; weighing arguments." RHETORICAL TERMS, supra note 161, at 192.
178. 722 F.2d 1332, 1336 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 1341 (Posner, J., dissenting).
180. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
181. 697 F.2d 761, 769 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
182. Posner's two other mixed concurring/dissenting opinions were Jackson v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., 717 F.2d 1045, 1057 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (a measured, respectful, thoughtful discussion of
jurisdictional and federal preemptive questions in a Railway Labor Act case), and Roberts
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 723 F.2d 1324, 1347, 1348 (7th Cir. 1983) (reh'g en banc)
(Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (reversing and remanding a patent
infringement verdict) (an eccentric and unattractive opinion-complete with drawings
of a socket wrench-that argued that, rather than a remand, an order to dismiss the
complaint should have been entered because the socket wrench patent was obvious as a
matter of law, opining, "I know that many lawyers and judges find the language of
economics repulsive. Yet the policies that have given shape to the patent statute are
quintessentially economic, and the language of economics is therefore the natural
language in which to articulate the test for obviousness." "This circuit grants rehearing
en banc very rarely, this is only our nineteenth en banc decision in the last five years, an
average of fewer than four a year. The basic reason for this parsimony is that a rehearing
en banc imposes a heavy burden on an already overburdened court.").
183. Merritt, 697 F.2d at 764.
184. Id. at 769 (Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
185. Id. (Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing McKeever v.
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Merritt, Posner explained the principles which supported his disagreement in
terms of both oppositional dissent""6 and collaborative dissent.8 7 In this regard,
Judge Posner delineated why he continued to contend that "the presumption
should be against appointment of counsel in prisoner civil rights cases":" 8
[A] prisoner who has a good damages suit should be able to hire a
competent lawyer and ... by making the prisoner go this route we
subject the probable merit of his case to the test of the market. Merritt
alleges that the defendants are legally responsible for his blindness.
If this were so, he would have a case that was attractive to many
personal-injury lawyers, even apart from the fillip of an award of
attorney's fees if the plaintiff prevails that 42 U.S.C. § 1988 adds
almost as a matter of course when a personal-injury case is brought
under one of the civil rights acts. If Merritt cannot retain a lawyer on
a contingent fee basis the natural inference to draw is that he does not
have a good case.8 9
Posner's subtle and clever diasyrmus9" of the prisoner's underlying
substantive claim on the merits is artfully raised in his succeeding discourse to
the level of a cohortatio 9' by use of the following language, which illuminates
the prisoner's particular situation and incentives:
It is reasonably clear to me that [the prisoner] does not have a
good case, so I am not surprised that he did not find a private lawyer
willing to represent him. The pathetic facts recited in the majority
opinion are not the facts found below. They are the facts Merritt
Israel, 689 F.2d 1315, 1324-25 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner J., dissenting)). In a previous
article I assessed Judge Posner's dissenting opinion in McKeever as "shrill and
unmeasured." Blomquist, supra note 1, at 729-30 (footnote omitted).
186. Merritt, 697 F.2d at 769 (Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(Notwithstanding consistent Seventh Circuit opinions to the contrary, Posner stated, "I
believe the presumption should be against appointment of counsel in prisoner civil rights
cases.").
187. See generally supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text (discussing how
collaborative and oppositional dissenting opinions blend into each other when an
appellate judge is not sure what voice to assume).
188. Merritt, 697 F.2d at 769 (Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
189. Id. at 769-70 (Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation
omitted).
190. "Diasyrmus" constitutes "disparagement of [an] opponent's arguments."
RHETORICAL TERMS, supra note 161, at 187.
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would have liked the district court to find. The district court found
that the cause of Merritt's blindness was and remains unknown, that
he received continuous, competent, and in fact solicitous medical care,
some of it at an outstanding university hospital, and that if this were a
medical malpractice case the defendants would be entitled to a
directed verdict in their favor. A fortiori, Merritt failed to prove a
"deliberate indifference" to his medical needs, as would be necessary
to show a violation of the Constitution and hence of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
the civil rights statute under which this suit was brought.'92
Continuing his opinion in Merritt, Judge Posner attempted to reach out to
other members of the Seventh Circuit in a collaborative effort to think through
the consequences of the evolving doctrine of appointed counsel in prisoner civil
rights litigation. Crafting an enargia93 with his words, Judge Posner observed:
We are embarking on a program of appointing counsel for
prisoners as a matter of course in civil cases without even considering
the practical consequences. We ought to consider the burden on the
bar in areas-most of which are not populous, and do not have large
numbers of lawyers-where the major prisons in this circuit are
located ... and we ought to consider the potential impact on the
dockets of our busy district courts, and ultimately on our crowded
docket, of "lawyerizing" prisoner civil litigation. I do not find a
consideration of these issues in the majority or concurring opinion.
We cannot expect Congress to dress the federal judiciary's self-
inflicted wounds. 94
Posner, thus, formulates the problem in memorable and practical terms
designed to make his colleagues wake up to the human limitations that their
decision presses against.
3. 1984
During 1984, Judge Posner wrote a total of six dissenting opinions: five
pure dissenting opinions 9 " and one mixed concurring/dissenting opinion.'96
192. Merritt, 697 F.2d at 770 (Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
193. An "enargia" is a "clear, lucid, vivid description." RHETORICAL TERMS, supra
note 161, at 185.
194. Merritt, 697 F.2d at 771 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
195. See Kelsay v. Consol. Rail Corp., 749 F.2d 437, 450 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner,
J., dissenting); Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1045 (7th Cir.
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Posner's dissent in Wheaton Van Lines, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce
Commission'97 addressed the need for federal courts to be faithful agents of
Congress in the interpretation of regulatory statutes, despite Posner's implicit
view that continuing to regulate the interstate transportation of goods by common
carrier was not economicallyjustified.'98 In Maier v. Federal Communications
Commission,'9 9 he directed his fire at the flabbiness of the panel majority's
treatment of standing in a case brought by the mayor of Milwaukee, Wisconsin
against a radio station that had aired a series of critical editorials concerning the
mayor's handling of public employee labor disputes, among other public issues.
The administrative complaint, brought before the FCC, argued that the editorials
violated the fairness doctrine and the personal attack rule of federal
communications law. Maintaining his concern for faithful application of
governing legal principles, Judge Posner dissented, saying that although he
agreed with the majority that the petition should be rejected, he "would dismiss
the petition for review rather than deny it."2° Posner wrote: "I begin with the
question of Mayor Maier's standing, thus reversing the order in which the
standing and reviewability issues are discussed in the majority opinion....' He
went on to contend, in blunt and simple language, that:
1984) (Posner, J., dissenting); United States v. Markgraf, 736 F.2d 1179, 1186 (7th Cir.
1984) (denial of reh'g en banc) (Posner, J., dissenting); Maier v. FCC, 735 F.2d 220,235
(7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., dissenting); Wheaton Van Lines, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce
Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1264, 1269 (7th Cir. 1984) (denial of reh'g en banc) (Posner, J.,
dissenting).
196. See Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 733 F.2d 1187, 1192 (7th
Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
197. Wheaton, 731 F.2d at 1269 (Posner, J., dissenting).
198. Judge Posner opined, in this regard:
The enforcement of this requirement [that a common carrier trucking firm
must charge, for the same service, the same rates to all customers] is essential
to the integrity of the [Interstate Commerce Commission Act's] common
carrier provisions; nonenforcement would allow trucking companies to offer
discounts to preferred customers... by applying to the ICC for contract
authority and describing their deal with those customers as contract rather
than common carriage. Of course the integrity of the Interstate Commerce
Act may not be worth preserving. Society might well be better off allowing
the prices for truck transportation to be determined by the free market,
regulated only by the antitrust laws. But that is ajudgment for Congress to
make.
Id. at 1270 (Posner, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
199. Maier, 735 F.2d at 235 (Posner, J., dissenting).
200. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
201. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
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[The majority] opinion, after deciding that Congress wanted decisions
such as the FCC's in this case to be judicially reviewable, argues that
therefore someone must have standing to seek judicial review, as
otherwise the congressional purpose would be thwarted. But this
ignores the fact that the requirement of standing is constitutional; if
any of the requirements of Article III of the Constitution for
maintaining a case in federal court are not satisfied, and as a result
an issue that Congress would like the court to review cannot be
reviewed, that is just too bad. The approach in the majority opinion
of putting reviewability before standing also ignores the fact that
someone besides Maier-a listener for example-might ... have a
better claim of standing to challenge the Commission's decision. 2
Continuing his remarkable, machine-gun-like attack on the majority opinion
in Maier, Posner unpacked the relevant FCC statutory provisions and interpreted
them in juxtaposition with the judicial review provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act (requiring "injury")." 3 After juxtapositioning, comparing and
contrasting three different types of disappointed complainants, 2°4 he concluded
that Maier lacked standing based on "[t]he tort concept of remoteness of
damage."2 As an alternative ground for his dissent, Posner analogized the
complaint in the case at bar (brought before and dismissed by the FCC) to
deceptive advertising complaints brought before and dismissed by the Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC"); both types of cases, Posner argued, are not
judicially reviewable based on principles of prosecutorial discretion and
deference to administrative agency decision making regarding agency-
promulgated doctrine.0 6 Striking a favorite theme of conservation of scarce
judicial resources, Posner complained:
[D]espite my brethren's remarks about the importance of preserving
judicial review of agency action, we have gotten along quite nicely
without judicial review of FTC decisions dismissing deceptive-
advertising complaints, and would get along quite as well without
judicial review of FCC decisions dismissing complaints .... We are
busy enough as it is.2"7
202. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting) (second emphasis added).
203. Id. at 235-36 (Posner, J., dissenting) (citing and discussing 5 U.S.C. § 702
(1982)).
204. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 236 (Posner, J., dissenting) (citing, inter alia, Palsgraf v. Long Island
R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928)).
206. Id. at 238 (Posner, J., dissenting).
207. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
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Turning from a significant administrative law case to a seemingly less
significant administrative law dispute, Judge Posner filed a dissenting opinion
from the denial of rehearing en banc in United States v. Markgraf 2 -a case
that, nevertheless, captured his attention because the Seventh Circuit panel
decision conflicted with two other circuit courts of appeal. Posner's partial
motivation for taking the trouble to file a rare dissent from a denial of a rehearing
en banc was his perennial concern with judicial economy. He stated:
At a time when the very large number of federal court of appeals
decisions being issued every year (in excess of 10,000, of which about
half are published opinions) makes it difficult for the Supreme Court
to resolve all of the conflicts between circuits that ought to be
resolved, we should hesitate before creating such a conflict.2"9
Furthermore, "if, as in this case, the first two circuits to consider the question
have reached the same result, the case for deference or at least for en banc
consideration is strengthened."2"0 However, Judge Posner also seems to have
been motivated by concern for the injustice the Markgrafs, a simple farm couple,
suffered. Turning his scholarly pragmatic guns on the matter, Posner wrote: "It
is not a compelling reply... that everyone is presumed to know the contents of
statutes. This is a legal fiction, and for more than 200 years we have been told
that the proper office of legal fictions is to prevent, rather than to create,
injustices." '' Continuing, he used ethopoeia1 2 in his dissent by imagining the
perspective of the farm couple in the controversy; here, he did it to illustrate
human motivation again-namely, the cynicism that is motivated by laws that are
applied too theoretically:
It would not be much consolation to a farmer whose farm had been
foreclosed without his knowing about the relief he might have gotten
under [the statute] that he ought to have studied the United States
Code more carefully; it is the kind of response that breeds popular
disrespect for law. There ought to be a better reason for turning down
his claim, such as the administrative burden to the government....
208. 736 F.2d 1179, 1186 (7th Cir. 1984) (denial of reh'g en banc) (Posner, J.,
dissenting).
209. Id. at 1186-87 (Posner, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 1187 (Posner, J., dissenting).
211. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting) (citing 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAws OF ENGLAND 43 (1768)).
212. "Ethopoeia" refers, in part, to "putting oneself in the place of another, so as
to both understand and express the other person's feelings more vividly." RHETORICAL
TERMS, supra note 161, at 185-86.
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All that the approach of the other circuits requires the government to
do is to add a sentence to the notice of foreclosure [giving notice of the
availability of legal relief before accelerating and foreclosing on the
loan]. The panel opinion of this circuit acknowledges that the burden
is slight; the government's brief makes no contrary claim.2"3
Posner ended his dissent in Markgraf with a surprisingly obscure, but
elegant skotison2" 4 argument:
Legislators cannot foresee and solve in advance all the problems that
will arise in the practical administration of the statutes they enact. The
judicial duty of statutory interpretation is not a duty merely to read; it
is a duty to help the legislature achieve the aims that can reasonably be
inferred from the statutory design, and it requires us to pay attention
to the spirit as well as the letter of the statute."5
Moving from a matter of administrative procedure to a concern of
constitutional import, in Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc.," Judge
Posner dissented from a panel opinion that upheld the constitutionality of the
Federal Magistrate Act. Judge Posner's opening paragraph summarized the basis
of his dissent:
Although impressed by the unbroken phalanx of opposing
authority in our sister circuits, and by my brethren's reasoning, I
cannot repress my conviction that 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), especially in
allowing magistrates to preside and enter judgment in diversity cases
(provided only that the parties consent to trial by magistrate), violates
the Constitution." 7
During the course ofhis Geras dissent, Posner cited Alexander Hamilton, 2 8
providing colorful hypotheticals (for example: "A district judge cannot tell his
law clerk, 'You try this case-I am busy with other matters-and render
judgment, and the losing party [can] if he wants appeal to the court of
213. Markgraf, 736 F.2d at 1187 (Posner, J., dissenting).
214. A "skotison" is "deliberately obscure speech." RHETORICAL TERMS, supra
note 161, at 195.
215. Markgraf, 736 F.2d at 1188 (Posner, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
216. 742 F.2d 1037, 1045 (7th Cir. 1984).
217. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 1046 (Posner, J., dissenting) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 78).
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appeals. "'). 219 Moreover, Posner delved into intricate legal history,22 ° matters of
statutory interpretation,22" ' and the considerable discretionary, and largely
unreviewable, powers of a U.S. magistrate to conduct trials.222 Finally, citing
statistics223 and describing the caseload crisis of the federal judiciary as the
motivating force behind appellate judicial approval of the Federal Magistrate
Act,224 Judge Posner crafted his dissenting opinion to conclude with-what
William Domnarski describes as an "essay"22 -the following elegant
epitrope,22 6 conceding certain points to the majority in an ironic way:
The concerns I have listed do not prove that section 636(c) is a
bad statute. They are speculative, and may well be outweighed by the
contribution that section 636(c) is making to relieving the federal
caseload crisis. Maybe section 636(c) is superior from a practical
standpoint to clearly constitutional alternatives such as appointing
more judges, abolishing diversity jurisdiction, or raising the price of
access to the federal courts. Maybe, indeed, the first section of Article
III is archaic and should be rewritten-but not by us. My point in
reviewing the concerns that lie behind the tenure and compensation
provisions [of Article III] is not to evaluate those concerns but only to
show that the key safeguards of trial by magistrate under 28 U.S.C. §
636(c)-requiring that the parties consent to trial by magistrate and
vesting in Article III judges the power of appointing the
magistrates-are not sufficiently responsive to those concerns to make
219. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting) (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1I).
220. Id. at 1046-47 (Posner, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 1047-48 (Posner, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 1049 (Posner, J., dissenting). On this point, Posner wrote:
The tone in which the trial judge addresses thejurors, counsel, and witnesses;
his rulings on evidence (especially evidence sought to be excluded as
cumulative or prejudicial); his management of the pace of the trial; his
decisions on the length and phrasing of the jury instructions; the manner in
which he reads or paraphrases the instructions to the jury, his supervision of
the jury's deliberations-these discretionary aspects of the trial judge's
responsibility are largely beyond the power of an appellate court to correct,
yet they can influence a jury's verdict.
Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
223. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
224. Id. at 1049-50 (Posner, J., dissenting) ("Since 1960, the caseload of the district
courts has tripled and that of the courts of appeals has octupled, and there has not been
a corresponding increase in the number ofjudges.").
225. DOMNARSK, supra note 50, at 135.
226. An "epitrope" "conced[es] agreement or permission to an opponent, often
ironically." RHETORICAL TERMS, supra note 161, at 193.
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the statute comport with the purpose (though in any event not text) of
Article III. Maybe section 636(c) is a small violation of the
Constitution. But the time to deal with this small violation is now,
before it sends down roots .... It will be harder to enforce the
Constitution against the excesses of the magistrate system when
magistrates try 10 or 20 or 50 percent of the nation's federal
trials....
The plaintiff is entitled to have the judgment below set aside and
the case remanded for a new trial, conducted by an Article IiI judge.227
In his dissenting opinion in Kelsay v. Consolidated Rail Corp.2 8-a
railroad crossing wrongful death suit governed by Indiana tort law, brought in
federal court by virtue of diversity jurisdiction-Judge Posner employed the
rhetorical technique diaeresis.229 As succinctly expressed at the outset of
Posner's opinion:
There was one very serious error at trial-the exclusion of the
evidence of prior accidents at the grade crossing-and one lesser
error-the giving of [jury] instruction 45; and together these errors are
sufficiently prejudicial to require that the judgment for the defendants
be reversed and the plaintiff be given a new trial.23
With his nuanced fact-sensitivity, tort law expertise, and penchant for
statistical analyses, Posner's key attack in his Kelsay dissent was on the trial
court's exclusion of two earlier fatal accidents at the relevant railroad crossing.
As he wrote:
[The two previous] accidents had also occurred early in the morning
on clear days with the driver going north and the train west. True, one
occurred 30 years before the accident to Kelsay and the other 13 years
before. But three fatal accidents in 30 years at one crossing averages
out to one fatal accident every 10 years, and though the railroad tries
to argue that this isn't very many, really it's an enormous number. We
were told at argument that there are 13,000 railroad crossings in
Indiana, and if they are all as dangerous as the one at which Kelsay
was killed this would imply 1,300 fatalities... in Indiana every year.
That is a tremendous number when one considers that in 1983,
227. Geras, 742 F.2d at 1053-54 (Posner, J., dissenting).
228. 749 F.2d 437, 450 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., dissenting).
229. "Diaeresis" is "dividing genus into species in order to amplify." RHETORICAL
TERMS, supra note 161, at 192.
230. Kelsay, 749 F.2d at 450 (Posner, J., dissenting).
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according to the Federal Railroad Administration, there were only 542
deaths at railroad crossings in the whole United States-less than half
as many as we could expect in Indiana alone if the railroad crossing in
this case was no more dangerous than the average railroad crossing.
.... The issue regarding the earlier accidents would not have
been whose fault they were but what they could tell the jury about the
dangerousness of the crossing and the railroad's duty to take some
steps to protect travelers at it. They could tell the jury plenty. The
danger of a crossing is a positive function of the probability that an
accident will occur, and one basis for estimating that probability is the
frequency of accidents in the past."'
Judge Posner "distinguishes himself as a writer by using a variety of tones
in his prose. His inquiring, expository voice dominates [his] opinions, but at
other times he becomes witty, funny, angry, sarcastic, satiric, mischievous,
biting, compassionate, and, on occasion, bored." '232 This arsenal of tones-in
conjunction with his witty use of rhetoric-helps stimulate his readers' attention
to the human drama that underpins the decision.233 In his opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part in Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago,234
Posner was angry:
Judge Dumbauld's [majority] opinion for this court is
concise--one might say summary-and not without wit. I admire
witty and concise opinions, remembering Holmes' adage that a judge
doesn't have to be heavy in order to be weighty. But I question the
appropriateness of treating the consent decree [between the FBI and
a public interest group to monitor and control FBI investigations] as
if it were a contract between two flour dealers one of whom had
"improvidently" agreed to the provision that the other is seeking to
enforce, when in fact it is a federal court order circumscribing the
FBI's investigative powers-and not with respect to particular
individuals or groups but across the board, and not in some
neighborhood or small town but in America's third-largest city, and at
a time not of domestic tranquility but of justifiable public anxiety
about domestic as well as international terrorism.
235
231. Id. at 450-51 (Posner, J., dissenting).
232. DoMNARSKI, supra note 50, at 125.
233. Id.
234. 733 F.2d 1187, 1192 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
235. Id. at 1193 (Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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The basis for Judge Posner's separate opinion inAlliance to EndRepression
was stated in language of rebuke, a kind of meiosis,23 6 of the trial judge:
The district judge enjoined a provision of the new Department of
Justice guidelines for FBI investigations as being inconsistent with a
consent decree that terminated a suit which charged the FBI with
abusing its investigatory powers by harassing political organizations
in Chicago.... I agree with my brethren that the injunction should be
set aside-but not that the district judge's interpretation of the consent
decree should be affirmed. I both disagree with her interpretation and
think she misused her equitable powers in not waiting till there was a
concrete dispute between the parties before interpreting the decree.237
Judge Posner amplified his language of rebuke toward the end of his
separate opinion in Alliance to End Repression in the following cohortatio:23
The country has grown accustomed to federal district judges'
presiding over prison systems, school systems, and mental institutions,
often pursuant to consent decrees. But to put a district judge in charge
of the FBI in Chicago would write a new chapter in the annals of
federal judicial enterprise, and though the decree does not go quite that
far it does give the judge a great deal of power over the FBI in
Chicago just by virtue of the inherent ambiguity of language-enough
power to make her role in enforcing the decree an extraordinary one
that if it is to be played well must be underplayed. A due regard for
the separation of powers, the flexibility of equity, the ambiguity of the
decree, the generality of the guidelines, the sensitivity and importance
of the subject matter, and the limitations ofjudicial competence should
have dissuaded her, and should dissuade us, from precipitating a
premature confrontation between the judicial and executive branches
in a setting where inevitably some people will say, with pardonable
exaggeration, that the federal judiciary is playing fast and loose with
the public safety. 39
236. See supra note 163.
237. Alliance, 733 F.2d at 1192-93 (Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
238. See supra note 191.
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4. 1985
In 1985 Judge Posner wrote nine pure dissenting opinions---by far the
most dissenting opinions written in any single year during his first twenty years
as a federal appellate judge.24 Ironically, in the same year he wrote a concurring
opinion with the lament, "I hesitate to add to the pile of opinions in this case;
separate opinions are the bane of the modem American judiciary."242
Posner's dissent in Jones Dairy Farm v. Local No. P-1236, United Food &
Commercial Workers International took issue with a panel decision that
affirmed a district court's decision vacating an arbitrator's finding that the
collective bargaining appeal in the case did not permit the contracting out of
work.243 Voicing his recurring concern with efficiency, Judge Posner thought
that the courts should defer to the arbitrator's award-even if based on an error
of law-because "labor disputes ought to be resolved rapidly; and, to be fast,
240. See Wilsey v. Eddingfield, 780 F.2d 614, 617 (7th Cir. 1985) (denial of reh'g
en banc) (Posner, J., dissenting); Tom v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 1250, 1258 (7th Cir. 1985)
(Posner, J., dissenting); Lippo v. Mobil Oil Corp., 776 F.2d 706, 722 (7th Cir. 1985)
(Posner, J., dissenting), aff'd, 802 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1986); Britton v. S. Bend Cmty.
Sch. Corp., 775 F.2d 794, 814 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., dissenting), vacated by 783
F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1986); Prater v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 764 F.2d 1230, 1240 (7th Cir.
1985) (Posner, J., dissenting), vacated by 775 F.2d 1157 (7th Cir. 1985); In re Crededio,
759 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., dissenting); Grossart v. Dinaso, 758 F.2d
1221, 1235 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., dissenting); Haffner v. United States, 757 F.2d
920, 921 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., dissenting); Jones Dairy Farm v. Local No. P-1236,
United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l, 755 F.2d 583, 584 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner,
J., dissenting), vacated by 760 F.2d 173 (7th Cir. 1985).
241. See supra note 139. During 1983, Judge Posner wrote his second highest
number of dissenting opinions-albeit only five were pure dissents and three were mixed
concurring/dissenting opinions. Id.
242. Phelps v. Duckworth, 772 F.2d 1410, 1416 (7th Cir. 1985) (reh'g en banc)
(Posner, J., concurring). Perhaps Judge Posner cannot help writing separate opinions
when his intellectual interest in a problem is piqued. In Phelps he wrote:
But the case so vividly illustrates the tenuous character of the modem law of
federal habeus corpus for state prisoners, and so urgently underscores the
need for a fresh approach to the entire subject, that I cannot resist
commenting briefly (too briefly to do full justice to an immensely complex
area) on what that approach might be, though I am mindful that judges at our
level are not empowered to adopt it.
Id. (Posner, J., concurring) (emphasis added). As I mentioned in my previous article,
perhaps some of Judge Posner's separate opinions were motivated by his desire to be
elevated to the United States Supreme Court. See Blomquist, supra note 1, at 730
(suggesting that conservative ideological statements in a Posner dissenting opinion during
his rookie season as a federal appellate judge were designed to attract attention for
possible elevation to the Supreme Court).
243. Jones Dairy, 755 F.2d at 584 (Posner, J., dissenting).
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arbitration must be final. Its finality is seriously compromised if an error of law
by the arbitrator is grounds for requiring the arbitrator to start over."2" Posner's
"inquiring, expository voice"245 in his Jones Dairy dissent is characterized by
impatient sarcasm: "Of course haste makes for error. But this is just to say that
there is a tradeoff between celerity and accuracy. If an employer doesn't like the
way arbitration strikes the tradeoff he needn't agree to an arbitration clause."2
His style in the concluding paragraph is cutting, as he catalogues the undesirable
results that the majority's decision is setting in motion:
By affirming the district court without even citing the many cases
that restrict the power of the courts to correct legal errors made by
labor arbitrators, and without even confining its holding to clear errors,
the decision today makes judicial review of labor arbitration uncertain,
may encourage employers to resist enforcement of labor arbitration
awards, and portends a most unwelcome expansion of the federal
courts' properly modest role in the labor field.
2 47
Judge Posner's dissent in Haffner v. United States-a federal estate tax
refund case which affirmed the district court's legal conclusion that public
housing agency obligations were exempt from taxation-focused on what he
"respectfully suggest[ed] is an unrealistic analysis of the legislative process" by
the panel majority.2 4 In his chief disagreement with the majority's reasoning,
Posner opined that even though the 1937 floor statement of a United States
Senator mischaracterized "the well-settled meaning of tax-exempt bonds,' 24 9 and
the bill's sponsor in the Senate did not object, this did not mean that both houses
of Congress endorsed the senator's idiosyncratic view when passing the
legislation. In a humorous tone, culminating in aprosopographia2 ° tone, Judge
Posner told a story in order to undermine the majority's reliance on what he
believed was an inconsequential fact, in light of the social and practical
conventions in which the fact was embedded:
Of course if [Senator Walsh's] misunderstanding was enacted by
Congress, that is the end of the case. But it would be unrealistic to
244. Id. at 586 (Posner, J., dissenting).
245. DOMNARSKI, supra note 50, at 125.
246. Jones Dairy, 755 F.2d at 586 (Posner, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 588 (Posner, J., dissenting).
248. Haffner v. United States, 757 F.2d 920, 923 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J.,
dissenting).
249. Id. at 922 (Posner, J., dissenting) (quotation marks omitted).
250. A "prosopographia" entails a "lively description of a person" or a "description
of imaginary persons or bodies." RHETORICAL TERMS, supra note 161, at 186.
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think it was. The statement occurred in the course of a long speech by
Senator Walsh explaining the provisions of the Act. The fact that no
one jumped up and said, "Senator, I think you have misstated the
effect of the tax-exemption language in section 5(e)," provides but
weak evidence that the Senate (and House, whose concurrence was,
of course, necessary for the enactment of the bill) intended to adopt a
novel form of tax exemption. It is true that Senator Wagner, the
author of the bill, was present and corrected Senator Walsh on some
other matters; but since Homer nods, maybe Senator Wagner did too,
on this occasion.51
In Grossart v. Dinaso a town bookkeeper brought a civil rights case,
complaining that she had been unconstitutionally discharged because of her
minor role in a political power struggle between a township executive and a
member of the township legislature. In his dissent, Judge Posner stated that a
remand of the case to the district court judge was required because it was unclear
on the record whether or not the bookkeeper was fired because she was
uncooperative or because of her politics.252 Wryly acknowledging that local
government officials might have petty motivations, Posner expressed his view
that since the bookkeeper's firing may have been partly due to her displeasing
one of the town's political factions, an impermissible ground for public
employment termination, a remand was required. 3 In contrast, his dissent in In
re Crededio comes off as abstract and ethereal in its contention that a district
court judge was required to find that as a condition of keeping an immunized
federal grand jury witness in jail for a longer period of time the witness'
continued incarceration "might yet induce him to testify before the grand
251. Haffner, 757 F.2d at 922 (Posner, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
252. Grossart v. Dinaso, 758 F.2d 1231, 1235 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J.,
dissenting).
253. Id. at 1235-36 (Posner, J., dissenting). Posner wrote with an insightful
mention of Anglo-American political history:
The district judge thought it possible to distinguish between a struggle over
power and a struggle over politics. I disagree. Nothing is more natural than
for a government official to convince himself that the powers of his office
ought to be greater than they are; such convictions are close to the heart of
political competition. The history of English liberty is the history of a power
struggle between the Crown and Parliament, each thinking it ought to be
supreme; and behind the American Revolution lies a power struggle between
Parliament and the colonial legislatures. Unless and until the Supreme Court
decides some day that the First Amendment does not apply with full force to
state and local government after all, we cannot distinguish these historical
illustrations of political strife from a struggle between the executive and
legislative departments of Worth Township, Illinois.
Id. at 1236 (Posner, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 69
44
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/7
JUDICIAL DISSENT
jury."'25 Perhaps, because he is mindful of the enormous imbalance of power
between a district court judge and a prisoner, he was coldly professional in
pointing out that "[a]s soon as it is clear that the inducement [of continued
incarceration] won't work, the purpose of civil contempt lapses, and the
continued imprisonment of the man becomes penal, and requires a criminal
proceeding." '25 5 While Posner's professorial style carried over to his dissent in
Prater v. U.S. Parole Commission256 -a habeus corpus case-the gravity of the
potential impact of the panel majority opinion on the functioning of the nation's
criminal justice system justified his careful limitation of the ex post facto
provision of Article I, Section 9 to legislative acts of Congress and not "the
practices of courts or executive agencies." '257 As Posner reasoned, leading up to
his ominatio58 conclusion:
If judges decide to get tougher on crime, or prosecutors drive harder
plea bargains, or parole boards take a more jaundiced view of
applications for parole, there is no violation of the prohibition [of
Article I, section 9 of the Constitution prohibiting ex post facto laws]
even though a criminal's punishment may end up being longer or
harsher than he could reasonably have expected when he committed
the crime....
Although my brethren only remand the case, let there be no
misapprehension about the significance of this decision. Any federal
prisoner who committed his crime before the enactment of the 1976
parole statute has a potential ex post facto claim under the decision
today. The decision will also leave the Parole Commission in grave
doubt as to whether it can apply the current statute to prisoners-who
must be legion-who committed their crimes before 1976. The
implications for state prisoners in this circuit are equally far-reaching,
given the parallel prohibition in Article I, section 10 of the
Constitution against ex post facto legislation by the states.2" 9
254. In re Credido, 759 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., dissenting).
255. Id. at 594 (Posner, J., dissenting).
256. 764 F.2d 1230, 1240 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., dissenting), vacated by 775
F.2d 1157 (7th Cir. 1985).
257. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting). Indeed, Judge Posner had the personal
gratification of having his dissenting views prevail in what became a majority opinion
for the Seventh Circuit-which he wrote. See Prater v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 802 F.2d
948 (7th Cir. 1986). See generally supra text accompanying note 32 (discussing one of
the motivations of writing a dissenting opinion: to appeal to future appellate judges to
adopt the reasoning of the dissenter).
258. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
259. Prater, 764 F.2d at 1240-42 (Posner, J., dissenting).
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Jumping from criminal constitutional law to an affirmative action dispute
pitting white public school teachers against an Indiana school corporation that
had agreed with the teachers' union not to lay off minority teachers in the event
of a reduction-in-force, Posner filed a dissenting opinion in Britton v. South Bend
Community School Corp.26° The dissent justified Judge Posner's view that the
lower court and a majority of his panel were wrong in upholding the lay offplan.
Posner's opinion is an aesthetic tour de force of logic, of rhetoric, and of
emotion. Initially, he succinctly and clearly related the pertinent facts and the
legal issue raised by the facts:
The public school system of South Bend, Indiana laid off 146
teachers. All were white; 48 had more seniority than blacks not laid
off; two years later 20 of the 48 had not yet been recalled. The school
system was carrying out a policy of not laying off any blacks. This
was racially discriminatory state action and the question is whether it
denied the 48 white teachers the equal protection of the laws, in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.26'
With great clarity, he set forth key definitions and pivotal rules for deciding
the affirmative action battle at hand. In this regard, he noted: "Discrimination
against whites, when connected in some way, however tenuously, to the history
of discrimination by whites, is called 'affirmative action,' or, less
euphemistically, 'reverse discrimination." 262 Continuing, Posner observed that
the debate over resolving such racial faceoffs "is bounded by two positions. 263
As Posner explained, deploying alliterative anaphora264 in his prose:
The first is that, like discrimination against members of minority
groups, it is illegal per se; that since rights against discrimination are
personal rather than group rights membership in a racial group confers
no entitlements; and that to hold that there is good racial
discrimination and bad racial discrimination and that only the bad is
unlawful would make the antidiscrimination principle too contingent,
too empirical, too subject to judicial caprice, and at once too heedless
of the legitimate rights of white people and too condescending toward
260. 775 F.2d 794, 814 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., dissenting), vacated by 783
F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1986).
261. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
262. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
263. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
264. "Alliteration" is the "recurrence of an initial consonant sound." RHETORICAL
TERMS, supra note 161, at 189. "Anaphora" is the "repetition of the same word at the
beginning of successive clauses or verses." Id. at 190.
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black people. The second position is that reverse discrimination is
permissible if reasonable in all the circumstances; that the law should
be capable of differentiating among types of discrimination that differ
in history, motivation, and consequence; and that inflexible
commitment to the idea of a color-blind Constitution would prevent
black people from overcoming the effects of centuries of severe
discrimination.26
Judge Posner devoted considerable effort to evaluating what the South Bend
School Corporation had done to its white and black teachers; in quickly moving
from one contention to the next, he exhibited epitrochasmus2" in his dissenting
opinion style. Thus, Posner considered "two possible ends to which the laying
off of these [white] teachers might conceivably be a proper means,"267 then
dismissed those ends because "this is not a case that arises out of discrimination
in hiring, whether against... particular black teachers who kept their jobs when
more senior whites were laid off or against any other black candidates for
teaching jobs in the South Bend public schools." '268 Posner quipped that "[m]y
brethren may think that any school system that segregated blacks and whites [in
school assignments] must have discriminated against blacks in hiring too,g269
then debunks this erroneous assumption and contends that "[t]he rational remedy
for discrimination in which South Bend engaged-for school segregation as
distinct from refusal to hire qualified black teachers-is not superseniority for
black teachers but equal assignments for black teachers."27 Posner considered
the "black role model" argument for giving black teachers superseniority over
white teachers as "arbitrary, '271 then he deconstructed "the point of comparing
the percentage of teachers who are black with the percentage of students who are
black, '272 then he moved back to analyzing the "insidious" nature of the black
role model argument. 3 Judge Posner ended his dissenting opinion in Britton by
265. Britton, 775 F.2d at 814-15 (Posner, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
266. "Epitrochasmus" is "a swift movement from one statement to another."
RHETORICAL TERMS, supra note 161, at 193.
267. Britton, 775 F.2d at 815 (Posner, J., dissenting).
268. Id. at 816 (Posner, J., dissenting).
269. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
270. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
271. Id. at 817 (Posner, J., dissenting).
272. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
273. Id. at 818 (Posner, J., dissenting). At this point in his dissenting opinion,
Judge Posner asks incisive rhetorical questions:
Supposing that black male students need black male teachers as role models,
should preference be given to black male over black female applicants for
teaching jobs? Are whites entitled to white role models in schools where
black or Asian or Hispanic teachers are overrepresented? Must the teaching
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skillful use of the argumentative technique ofperistrophe.. with the following
language:
The harshness of the discrimination practiced in this case does
not go completely unremarked by my brethren, but they do not draw
the obvious conclusion, which is that the defendants ought to be
required to show that this discrimination was necessary to achieve
some clearly lawful end. My brethren remark [on] the painful
character of what the defendants have done to the plaintiffs, yes, but
the only solace they offer these plaintiffs, who have lost their jobs, is
to note that the loss is, for most of them anyway, temporary; that many
white teachers, though not necessarily the plaintiffs, voted to give the
blacks extra seniority; and that in any event the plaintiffs, being white,
have not been "stigmatized" by being laid off. Although man does not
live by bread alone, neither does he live by self-esteem alone, and it is
small comfort to a person who loses his job as a result of
discrimination in favor of a black to be told that he has, after all, the
consolation of being white, that most of the people who have
discriminated against him are themselves white, and that he may get
his job back some day soon-though some of these plaintiffs have
been waiting for three years. I am willing to accept that the equal
protection clause means as a practical matter less for whites than for
blacks but not that it means nothing at all, which if this decision stands
will be the approximate situation in this circuit after today.
27
Posner's practical attention to the unfairly laid off workers, as he ticked off
the crumbs of cold comfort they will find with the decision, again shows him
dissenting from a disingenuous majority opinion that idealized the impact of its
decision.
staff of every public school in the United States reflect the racial, ethnic,
sexual, and religious composition of the student population of the school?
Should a school system assign only black teachers to a school that has only
black students? Would not the "role model" argument, carried to an extreme,
carry us back to where Indiana was before 1949, with a system of segregated
schools, in which blacks attended schools staffed (presumably) by black
teachers? In order to answer these heavily rhetorical questions "no" yet
accept the defendants' role-model argument in this case we need some
evidence, and have none.
Id. at 818-19 (Posner, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
274. "Peristrophe" is "converting an opponent's argument to one's own use."
RHETORICAL TERMs, supra note 161, at 194.
275. Britton, 775 F.2d at 821 (Posner, J., dissenting).
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In his next dissenting opinion, Lippo v. Mobil Oil Corp.,276 involving a
dealer's termination of a gasoline service station supplier (deliberately selling
another gasoline supplier's gas under Mobil's name), Judge Posner opened his
opinion with a searing sarcasmus:277
The proposition that my learned brethren embrace in this case is
that a dealer can defraud his supplier and yet the supplier be helpless
to terminate him. If a statute or some other source of law required this
result then one could but shake one's head in wonder at the asininity
of the law. But no law requires the result. It is the contract that, in my
brethren's view, requires it; in their view the supplier, though a large
and vastly experienced franchisor, empowered the dealer to commit
fraud yet remain a dealer in good standing.27
In Posner's view, a provision in the Lippo-Mobil contract that allowed
Mobil to terminate the contract only if a default by the franchisee went
uncorrected for more than ten days had to be read to allow cure only for
"unimportant and inadvertent and . . . involuntary" breaches;279 however,
according to Posner, "[m]isbranding ... is never that kind" of innocent, good-
faith breach.280 Rather, in Posner's view: "It is not possible for a dealer to find
himself accidentally selling, from Mobil's underground storage tanks and pumps,
gasoline supplied by another producer. It is especially not possible in a case
such as this, where the dealer handles only one brand of gas." '281
Posner's dissenting opinion in Lippo is worth quoting at length because it
provided a penetrating law and economics take on the dispute:
It is no answer that Mobil can sue Lippo for breach of contract.
If a breach of contract is committed by conduct that is also tortious, the
breach is not excused just because the victim has a right to bring a tort
suit. The purpose of making a breach of contract a ground for
termination by the other party is that termination-self-help--is
normally a much cheaper remedy than having to bring a lawsuit,
meanwhile being locked into an unwanted contractual relationship,
here with someone who is not much better than a thief. The right to
sue would be an especially inadequate substitute for the right to
276. 776 F.2d 706, 722 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., dissenting).
277. A "sarcasmus" is "a bitter gibe or taunt." RHETORICAL TERMS, supra note
161, at 187.
278. Lippo, 776 F.2d at 722 (Posner, J., dissenting).
279. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
280. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
281. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
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terminate in this case. Not only are Mobil's expenses of suit likely to
exceed the amount of damages that can actually be collected from the
owner of a gas station, but the amount of provable damages is likely
to be small relative to the actual injury to Mobil. The injury is not the
loss of some revenues; that is minor. The injury is the impairment of
Mobil's trademarks, and cannot readily be quantified. The fact that it
cannot be readily quantified does not make it trivial; and even if what
Lippo did to Mobil was a trivial harm, still we must consider the
implications if every Mobil dealer may deliberately misuse Mobil's
trademarks, to his profit, without losing his franchise. The cumulative
effects could be very serious, and can be prevented under the view my
brethren take only if Mobil brings suit against every dealer
emboldened by the majority opinion to engage in misbranding. It is
(putting the matter with great restraint) unlikely that this is the only
remedy that the parties meant to allow to Mobil.2" 2
Moving from a commercial dispute to another administrative decision, in
Tom v. Heckler, Judge Posner's acerbic dissenting opinion took issue with the
majority's decision to reverse and remand a Social Security disability claim
case.283 Posner severely criticized the idea of "appellate judges conceiv[ing]
their duty to be to search the record in the trial court or the administrative agency
for errors that the appellant's counsel missed, and to reverse if any are found."2
While his opinion seems harsh for condemning his brethren for straining the
bounds of the law to help individuals who are in a pathetic situation, he was
attentive to a larger stage of characters-the plaintiffs who do not have the
resources to retain a lawyer. While his view might be criticized for second-
guessing the situation of individuals who do not bring suit, his statements
illustrate his dramatizing, motive-seeking style:
Granted, too, disappointed applicants for social security disability
benefits are for the most part rather pathetic people whose plight tugs
at the judicial heartstrings; but we are not authorized to give a fuller
measure ofjustice to one class of lawyer-represented civil appellants
than to others on grounds of sentiment or sympathy, and it is always
well to bear in mind that the payment of government benefits to one
applicant reduces the public moneys available for other, perhaps
equally worthy, causes.2"5
282. Id. at 723 (Posner, J., dissenting).
283. Tomv. Heckler, 779 F.2d 1250, 1258 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., dissenting).
284. Id. at 1259 (Posner, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 1260 (Posner, J., dissenting). If the significance of a dissenting opinion
is, at least in part, a product of its impact on the majority opinion writers, Judge Posner's
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In a dissenting opinion in Wilsey v. Eddingfield,"6 Judge Posner would have
"grant[ed] rehearing en banc to resolve the conflict between [the Seventh
Circuit] and the other circuits over whether the citizenship of a personal
representative is controlling for purposes of determining whether there is
diversity of citizenship."2"7  Posner's dissenting opinion style in Wilsey is
somewhat pedantic; yet, his opinion raises significant legal and precedential
concerns that were either of no interest to a majority of his circuit colleagues or
too refined to justify the extra effort of a rehearing en banc.
5. 1986
During 1986 Judge Posner substantially cut back on the frequency of his
dissenting opinions:" he authored four pure dissenting opinions289 and one
mixed concurring/dissenting opinion.290
Posner's extended dissent in United States v. Green was based on his
fervent attention to a "boring detail," an underlying fact that the court should not
have forgotten, even though the prosecution was driven by more compelling
concerns to sweep it under the rug. Green-a Chicago police officer whose job
was to mail letters to people suspected of leaving the scene of an accident-did
not commit the crime for which he had been charged (mail fraud) and did not
receive a fair trial.2 ' According to Posner, to prove federal mail fraud, "[t]he
government had to show not that the fraudulent scheme would have failed if
Green hadn't mailed the letters but that he mailed them 'for the purpose of
dissent in Tom v. Heckler was significant. Judge Harlington J. Wood, Jr., the majority
opinion's author, devoted an extended footnote to Posner's dissent. Id. at 1257 n.12
("We have great doubt, contrary to Judge Posner's view, that this majority opinion willjeopardize our whole system of appellate justice.... We shall not respond to certain
other comments by Judge Posner which we view so far afield from what is necessary or
appropriate to the decision of this case on its merits.").
286. 780 F.2d 614, 617 (7th Cir. 1985) (denial of reh'g en banc) (Posner, J.,
dissenting).
287. Id. at 617-18 (Posner, J., dissenting).
288. See supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
289. Chaulk v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 808 F.2d 639, 643 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Posner, J., dissenting); Sally Beauty Co. v. Nexxus Prods. Co., 801 F.2d 1001, 1008 (7th
Cir. 1986) (Posner, J., dissenting); Forrester v. White, 792 F.2d 647, 658 (7th Cir. 1986)(Posner, J., dissenting), rev'd, 484 U.S. 219 (1988); United States v. Green, 786 F.2d
247, 255 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J., dissenting).
290. United States v. Town of Cicero, Ill., 786 F.2d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
291. Green, 786 F.2d at 255 (Posner, J., dissenting). However, as he pointed out
at the end of his dissent: "Although I have little doubt that Green is guilty of extortion
(and of a RICO violation as well ... ), I don't think he is guilty of mail fraud and I think
his trial was unpardonably sloppy." Id. at 260 (Posner, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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executing' the scheme. 292 Posner's predominate style in this opinion was to
amplify his point that the prosecution didn't prove the case it brought against
Green by epandos to drive home his point that the prosecution forgot one crucial
thing in its zeal to put the unsavory Green behind bars.293 In this regard, Posner
initially parsed the factual part of the case (that the cop's "fraud consisted of
extorting money from the [hapless] people interviewed [who had come in as a
result of his official letters], and was a fraud on the police department"294);
Posner then discussed the legal part of the case -that while "[ift is tempting in
a mail fraud case to think of the fraud as the important thing, and the use of the
mails as a boring detail,"29 by the terms of the federal statute, "it is the mailing,
not the fraud, that is the crime .... [a]nd a mailing violates the statute only when
it is made for a fraudulent purpose. 296
Ultimately, he linked the factual and legal parts of the case with a
conclusion: "The focus of this case should have been on the purpose of the
mailings; if that purpose was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt to be fraud,
Green was entitled to an acquittal. 297 Judge Posner's dissenting opinion in
Green is vivid and persuasive because of his use of colorful metaphors ("There
is no evidence that he took the job because it would give him an opportunity by
use of the mails to reel in fish to shake down, or that he mailed letters to people
he thought particularly susceptible to being shaken down. ... 298); his humorous
antapodosis,299 pointing out the absurd ("The majority.., says that 'the jury
could infer that in mailing each notice Green had in mind prior episodes of
extortion and contemplated future ones.' ... One might as well say that in
brushing his teeth every morning he thought about past and upcoming
extortion.");300 his mention of apt analogy ("There is an illuminating analogy to
the Mann Act, which forbids transporting a woman for an immoral purpose (18
U.S.C. § 2421), just as the mail fraud statute forbids mailing a letter for a
fraudulent purpose");' his biting deployment of asteismus30 2 ("The majority
opinion :. . calls this a dictum [in an on point Supreme Court opinion]. The
292. Id. at 255 (Posner, J., dissenting) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982)).
293. "Epandos" is "expanding a statement by discussing it part by part."
RHETORICAL TERMS, supra note 161, at 183.
294. Green, 786 F.2d at 255 (Posner, J., dissenting).
295. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
296. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
297. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
298. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
299. "Antapodosis" is "a simile in which the objects compared correspond in
several respects." RHETORICAL TERMS, supra note 161, at 188.
300. Green, 786 F.2d at 256 (Posner, J., dissenting).
301. Id. at 257 (Posner, J., dissenting).
302. "Asteismus" is a "facetious or mocking answer that plays on a word."
RHETORICAL TERMS, supra note 161, at 189.
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operational definition of dictum is, the part of a previous opinion that the court
in the current case disagrees with. If what I have quoted is dictum, then what is
the holding... ?,,);3 3 and his clever use of hypotheticals.3°4 Essentially, Posner
recognized that the court, along with the prosecution, was swayed by a lack of
sympathy for Green; yet, Posner dissented in Green because he believed that the
impact of the decision was damaging to society at large.
Posner's serious attention to the rules that bind judges is evident in
Forrester v. White, where he filed a dissenting opinion from a panel ruling which
held that the doctrine of judicial immunity shielded a state judge from liability
for damages for alleged sex discrimination in firing a probation officer under her
administrative control."' 5 In another bravura exercise of epandos,3 °6 Posner
deconstructed the majority's reasoning, noting that "[tihe failure to distinguish
carefully among the different kinds of acts that judges perform is, indeed, the
fatal weakness in the majority opinion."30 7 In his view, the majority opinion gave
judges too much protection and would create uncertainty in the behavior of those
who dealt with them. He wrote:
Carried to its logical extreme, the opinion would attach absolute
immunity to any major decision made by a judge within the scope of
his lawful powers. The proper question is whether the decision was
made in the judge's judicial capacity. Judges have both judicial and
executive functions. Hiring and firing subordinates are executive
functions.3 "
Moreover, Posner criticized the majority's limited holding in Forrester as
misguided because it raises more questions than it resolves. Posner's technique
on this point is a gentle, yet incisive, rebuke of the holdings, from the perspective
of the foreseeable legal process:
303. Green, 786 F.2d at 257 (Posner, J., dissenting).
304. See id. at 259 (Posner, J., dissenting):
Suppose a clerk in a comer grocery store, as he is required by the nature of hisjob to do, mails hundreds of bills to customers with charge accounts, and
steals from the cash register some of the checks he deposits there when the
customers pay their bills-and is indicted on hundreds of counts of federal
mail fraud. This hypothetical case (minus the hundreds of counts) was as a
matter of fact argued to the Supreme Court [in a previous case that Posner
contended was dispositive], and seems to me the type of case the Court meant
to rule out of the mail fraud statute and confine to the jurisdiction of state
criminal law. The present case is indistinguishable.
305. Forrester v. White, 792 F.2d 647, 658 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J., dissenting),
rev'd, 484 U.S. 219 (1988).
306. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
307. Forrester, 792 F.2d at 663 (Posner, J., dissenting).
308. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
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So I think my brethren are wrong to grant Judge White absolute
immunity, and I would reverse the judgment of the district court. But
I also think that the protection against suit that the majority opinion
creates is illusory. The majority is so intent on writing a narrow
opinion that it leaves the scope of its new doctrine of absolute
immunity entirely uncertain. Can it really be that the doctrine is to be
limited to the firing of probation officers in Illinois juvenile courts?
The logic of the opinion cuts a much broader swath, but judges cannot
be (perhaps should not be) forced to apply principles in their full
logical reach. The majority calls for "a critical evaluation of the
concerns underlying the defense" of absolute immunity in each case;
it declines to express any "opinion on other decisions relating to Judge
White's staff or even to probation officers in a different court system,
because it must be determined in each case that the grant of immunity
advances the policies behind it." It is right for judges to be cautious
when they set sail on unchartered seas, but in the field of immunities
this may be a reason for not leaving port in the first place. The
absolute immunity for ajudge's legal rulings is about as definite a rule
as we have in our legal system, and the absolute immunity that the
court creates today is about as indefinite, which robs the principle of
its value to the judges and to the public. Absolute immunity provides
real security only if the scope of the immunity is well defined. Under
the court's approach the process of definition will be protracted and
may never yield a clear rule on which employees orjob applicants may
sue which judges and which may not, and for what. We shall still
have to buy liability insurance.3"9
Thus, in his Forrester dissent Posner imagined the rule the majority created as
it would apply to real employees and job applicants to illustrate exactly how it
would create problems.
In a diversity case between two corporations involved with hair care, Sally
Beauty Co. v. Nexxus Products Co., Judge Posner seemed to relish using the
Uniform Commercial Code to lambast the majority panel decision during the
course of his succinct dissenting opinion.310 In a kind of anemographia,'
Posner began his dissent in Sally Beauty with the following synoptical
description of the majority opinion:
309. Id. at 664 (Posner, J., dissenting).
310. Sally Beauty Co. v. Nexxus Prods. Co., 801 F.2d 1001, 1008 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Posner, J., dissenting).
311. "Anemographia" is a "description of the wind." RHETORICAL TERMS, supra
note 161, at 185.
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My brethren have decided, with no better foundation thanjudicial
intuition about what businessmen consider reasonable, that the
Uniform Commercial Code gives a supplier an absolute right to cancel
an exclusive-dealing contract if the dealer is acquired, directly or
indirectly, by a competitor of the supplier. I interpret the Code
differently.
312
Continuing, Judge Posner used a colorful metaphor to describe the majority
opinion's weak reasoning, which relied on a precedent dealing with the ability
to terminate an exclusive-dealing personal services contract that did not, in his
view, conform to the facts of the case at bar. "By rejecting that characterization
here [that the underlying contract was one for personal services], my brethren
have sawn off the only limb on which they might have sat comfortably. 313
Skillfully deploying syncrisis,314 intermingled with law and economics analysis,
he criticized the his colleagues' logic as follows:
My brethren find this a simple case-as simple (it seems) as if a
lawyer had undertaken to represent the party opposing his client. But
notions of conflict of interest are not the same in law and in business,
and judges can go astray by assuming that the legal-services industry
is the pattern for the entire economy. The lawyerization of America
has not reached that point. Sally Beauty, though a wholly owned
subsidiary of Alberto-Culver, distributes "hair care" supplies made by
many different companies, which so far as appears compete with
Alberto-Culver as vigorously as Nexxus does. Steel companies both
make fabricated steel and sell raw steel to competing fabricators.
General Motors sells cars manufactured by a competitor, Isuzu. What
in law would be considered a fatal conflict of interest is in business a
312. Sally Beauty, 801 F.2d at 1008 (Posner, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
While the work of French philosopher Henri Bergson (1839-1941) may have esconced
intuition into the epistemic enterprise, see GILLES DELEUZE, BERGSONISM 14 (Hugh
Tomlinson & Barbara Habberjam trans., 1988), it is not a mainstream method ofjudicial
process. But see OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881), for the following
famous observation:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions
of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges
share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the
syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed.
Id. (emphasis added).
313. Sally Beauty, 801 F.2d at 1009 (Posner, J., dissenting).
314. "Syncrisis" involves "comparing contrary elements in contrasting clauses."
RHETORICAL TERMS, supra note 161, at 185.
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commonplace and legitimate practice. The lawyer is a fiduciary of his
client; Best was not a fiduciary ofNexxus.3"'
Posner completed his Sally Beauty dissent through the strategic use of
hypophora,316 mixed with erotesis.3"7 Some of the fact-intensive questions he
posed were:
"How likely is it that the acquisition of Best could hurt
Nexxs?"318
* "Could Nexxus have canceled the contract, fearing that Best
(perhaps unconsciously) would favor Alberto-Culver products
over Nexxus products?"3 9
" "[W]hat guarantee has Alberto-Culver that consumers would be
diverted from Nexxus to it, rather than to products closer in price
and quality to Nexxus products?""32
* "Will these powerful competitors continue to distribute their
products through Sally Beauty if Sally Beauty displays favoritism
for Alberto-Culver products?"32'
* "Would not such a display be a commercial disaster for Sally
Beauty, and hence for its parent, Alberto-Culver?" '322
" "Is it really credible that Alberto-Culver would sacrifice Sally
Beauty in a vain effort to monopolize the 'hair care' market, in
violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act? '3 23
315. Sally Beauty, 801 F.2d at 1010 (Posner, J., dissenting).
316. "Hypophora" is "asking questions and immediately answering them."
RHETORICAL TERMS, supra note 161, at 193.
317. "Erotesis" is the asking of"a 'rhetorical question' implying but not giving an
answer." Id. Posner's combined use of hypophora and erotesis constituted, together, the
global argumentative technique of"pysma": "asking many questions that require diverse
answers." Id. at 194.
318. Sally Beauty, 801 F.2d at 1010 (Posner, J., dissenting).
319. Id. at 1011 (Posner, J., dissenting).
320. Id. at 1010 (Posner, J., dissenting).
321. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
322. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
323. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting). Judge Posner concluded that "[t]he judgment
should be reversed and the case remanded for a trial on whether the merger so altered the
conditions of performance that Nexxus is entitled to declare the contract broken." Id. at
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Posner also relied on a law and economics analysis to illuminate conduct
in the courtroom in his dissenting opinion in Chaulk v. Volkswagen ofAmerica,
Inc. In that opinion he issued a diatribe against professional expert witnesses as
well as a critique of appellate over-reaching in helping plantiffs.324 Objecting to
the majority's reversal of the directed verdict in favor of the car manufacturer on
the issue of whether a negligent design had caused the plantiff s personal injuries
in an automobile accident, Posner mounted a cutting ad hominem3 2' attack on the
plaintiff's expert. In memorable prose, with a reference to an obviously absurd
hypothetical, Judge Posner described the expert, Martens, as follows:
[O]n cross-examination Martens made clear that his position, whether
reflecting a genuine and disinterested conviction or a pecuniary self-
interest, is that almost all door latches, including one for which he
holds a patent and Volkswagen's subsequent latch design, are
unreasonably dangerous: specifically, all door latches that can be
sprung by inward rather than downward pressure; perhaps all
automobile door latches, period, except that of Mercedes-Benz; at the
very least, the door latches found in 30 million cars now on American
roads. Martens was unwilling to concede that any automobile door
latch except that of the Mercedes-Benz, including latches he himself
had designed, is reasonably safe....
Martens' was the testimony either of a crank or, what is more
likely, of a man who is making a career out of testifying for plaintiffs
in automobile accident cases in which a door may have opened; at the
time of trial he was involved in 10 such cases. His testimony
illustrates the age-old problem of expert witnesses who are "often the
mere paid advocates or partisans of those who employ and pay them,
as much so as the attorneys who conduct the suit. There is hardly
anything, not palpably absurd on its face, that cannot now be proved
by some so-called 'experts."'
It is not the law . . . that the standard of care is set by the
designers of [the most expensive] automobiles, so that the omission of
any safety device found in such automobiles is negligent .... The
buyer of a Mercedes 560 may be willing to pay extra for minuscule,
perhaps wholly theoretical, improvements in safety, but such a buyer's
1011 (Posner, J., dissenting).
324. Chaulk v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 808 F.2d 639, 643 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Posner, J., dissenting). Posner raised this latter point in his earlier dissenting opinion
in Tom v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 1250, 1259 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J., dissenting). See
supra notes 283-85 and accompanying text.
325. An "argumentum ad hominem" involves: "(1) abuse of your opponent's
character; (2) basing your argument on what you know of your opponent's character."
RHETORICAL TERMS, supra note 161, at 191.
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willingness to buy the ultimate refinement in safety technology does
not define the standard of care for the whole industry.
Ours is not a system of people's justice, where six laymen are
allowed to condemn an entire industry on the basis of absurd
testimony by a professional witness. If Martens had testified that the
[Volkswagen] Rabbit in which Chaulk was riding should have been
equipped with radar or a force field or an ejection seat, my brethren
would agree that the directed verdict was proper.
326
Jumping from expert witness testimony to civil rights, Judge Posner filed
a partial concurring and dissenting opinion in United States v. Town of Cicero,
Illinois,327 a Title VII case brought by the federal government. The majority
vacated the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction in favor of the
plaintiff, but chose to remand for further proceedings below. According to Judge
Posner:
The denial of the government's motion for a preliminary
injunction against the enforcement of [Cicero's ordinances prohibiting
anyone who had not lived in the town a minimum number of years
from applying for a municipal job] must be reversed for the reasons
given by the majority, but since I think the government is entitled to
the injunction I would remand with directions to issue it.32
Judge Posner was convinced that it made no sense to delay the matter and
waste scarce judicial resources below because, as he asserted, "Itihe record
compiled in the preliminary injunction hearing makes the strongest case for
violation of Title VII on a 'disparate impact' theory that I have seen in my [then]
four years ofjudging. 329 After extensive analysis of the record, he concluded
that "[i]t goes without saying that the town should have an opportunity to
convince the district court that the facts are otherwise than they appear on the
basis of the... government's motion for preliminary injunction";33 ° however, in
Posner's view, "the government's entitlement to the temporary relief that it has
326. Chaulk, 808 F.2d at 644-45 (Posner, J., dissenting) (quoting Keegan v. Minn.
& St. Louis R.R., 78 N.W. 965,966 (Minn. 1899)). A few years after Posner's dissenting
opinion, the United States Supreme Court had the occasion to strictly regulate the
introduction of expert testimonyin federal trials. See generally Robert F. Blomquist, The
Dangers of "General Observations " on Expert Scientific Testimony: A Comment on
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 82 KY. L.J. 703 (1993).
327. 786 F.2d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
328. Id. (Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
329. Id. (Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
330. Id. at 338 (Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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sought is sufficiently established to warrant our directing the entry of a
preliminary injunction."33'
C. The Second Five Years, 198 7-1991
1. 1987
During 1987 Judge Posner authored only two pure dissenting opinions, with
no mixed concurring and dissenting opinions.332 Posner's first dissent during
1987 was in Jordan v. Duff and Phelps, Inc.333-a case involving a closely-held
corporation and a disgruntled former stockholder-employee of a securities
research firm. In a dissenting opinion that was labeled "lucid[] and cogent[] (and
ingenious[])" by the concurrence,334 Judge Posner summarized the factual
essence of the case and reduced the underlying dispute to the following key
issue:
Jordan does not argue that Duff and Phelps made any misleading
statements. He makes nothing of the fact that when he told Hansen he
was quitting, Hansen said that the firm had a good potential for growth
and that Jordan's shares would rise in value if he stayed. The target
of the complaint is not misrepresentation or even misleading half-
truths; it is Hansen's omission to tell Jordan that he should think twice
about quitting since the company might soon be sold at a price that
would increase the value of Jordan's stock almost 30-fold. The
statement that Hansen failed to make may have been material, since it
might have caused Jordan to change his mind about resigning.... But
I shall pass this point and assume materiality, in order to reach the
more fundamental question, which is duty.335
Posner employed extensive law and economics analysis to review the
wisdom of implying a contractual duty to disclose a potential future sale of the
corporation to Jordan; in this respect he discussed the economics of
information,336 assessed "market constraints against exploiting... employee
331. Id. (Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
332. See Lauer v. Bowen, 818 F.2d 636, 641 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.,
dissenting); Jordan v. Duff& Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 444 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.,
dissenting).
333. Jordan, 815 F.2d at 444 (Posner, J., dissenting).
334. Id. at 443 (Cudahy, J., concurring). Judge Cudahy also labeled the majority
opinion by Judge Easterbrook "lucid[] and cogent[] (and ingenious[])." Id. (Cudahy, J.,
concurring).
335. Id. at 445 (Posner, J., dissenting).
336. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
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shareholders" based on the importance of business good will,337 and rebutted the
majority opinion's quotation of Posner's "academic writings concerning the
purpose of contract law."33 Moreover, Posner continued his dissent in Jordan
by opining: "Although my principal disagreement is with the majority's holding
about duty to disclose, I also have reservations about the majority's discussion
of causation and damages. The majority is rightly troubled by the issue of
causation. If Hansen had made full disclosure to Jordan, what would have
happened?""39 He uses a catachresis3"4 to offer a prediction: "The case on
remand [and trial] will be a soap opera."34' Finally, he ends his dissent with a
hypertechnical quibble with the economic analysis of the majority opinion
writer-Judge Frank Easterbrook-and a multifactor prognostication, in the
nature of epiplexis,4 2 on how causation should be figured in the trial on
remand.3
43
Posner's second dissenting opinion during 1987 was in Lauer v. Bowen-an
appeal of a denial of a Social Security disability claim.344 Starting with a kind
of thaumasmus,a3 4 he gets the reader's immediate attention: "My brethren have
misread the social security ruling on which they rely, as well as the regulation on
which they refuse to rely. The result is to make an easy case hard, and to
337. Id. at 448 (Posner, J., dissenting).
338. Id. at 449 (Posner, J., dissenting).
339. Id. at 451 (Posner, J., dissenting).
340. A "catachresis" is an "implied metaphor; extravagant, farfetched metaphor."
RHETORICAL TERMS, supra note 161, at 189.
341. Jordan, 815 F.2d at 451 (Posner, J., dissenting).
342. "Epiplexis" consists of "asking a question [or questions] in order to reproach."
RHETORICAL TERMS, supra note 161, at 187.
343. Jordan, 815 F.2d at 451 (Posner, J., dissenting). According to Posner,
causation would depend on answers, after trial, to the following six questions:
(1) What value would Jordan have placed on the shares, if he had known
what Hansen knew? He is not an investment bank.
(2) What was Jordan's attitude toward taking risks?
(3) How would Jordan have traded off his estimate of the value of his
shares-a value he could not have realized immediately even if he had
remained with Duff and Phelps-against the higher salary he was to receive
[in his future job] in Houston and against freedom from domestic conflict
[since his wife wanted to leave Chicago]?
(4) Would Hansen have let Jordan rescind his resignation?
(5) If so, would Jordan still have been working for Duff and Phelps two years
later, when the firm was reorganized?
(6) In this connection, how would Jordan have reacted to the collapse of the
Security Pacific deal? Would this have precipitated his departure?
Id. at 451-52 (Posner, J., dissenting).
344. Lauer v. Bowen, 818 F.2d 636, 641 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J., dissenting).
345. A "thaumasmus" is "an exclamation of wonder." RHETORICAL TERMS, supra
note 161, at 188.
[Vol. 69
60
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/7
JUDICIAL DISSENT
interfere unjustifiably with the administration of social security disability
benefits."'3 " In Posner's view, "[t]he administrative law judge found that the
applicant is capable of engaging in substantial gainful activity. That finding,
which is supported by substantial evidence, is dispositive of the claim for
benefits. 3 47 After an extended parsing of what he contended was the pertinent
regulatory provision, he ended his opinion on a familiar note, writing: "Cases
such as this tug at the heart; but misreading the Social Security Administration's
rulings and regulations can only sow confusion and reduce the funds available
to pay benefits to persons entitled to them. ..
2. 1988
Judge Posner's output of dissenting opinions during 1988 increased to a
total of five opinions: three pure dissenting opinions349 and two mixed
concurring/dissenting opinions.350 In Smith v. Director, Office of Workers'
Compensation Programs,35" ' Posner's dissent led offwith a strident bdelygma:3 52
"The administrative law judge's opinion, granting benefits under the black-lung
act to William Smith's widow, is illogical and scientifically ignorant; it is a
travesty of factfinding. The administrative law judge played doctor, and played
it badly."353 He explained the basis for this characterization in succinct fashion:
"The only medical [expert] testified that Smith had been disabled as a result of
the heart disease that eventually killed him, not as a result of the mild black-lung
disease shown on the only X-ray that provides any evidence of the disease." '354
To Posner, "[n]ot only does the record establish that the employer carried its
burden of proving that Smith was not totally disabled by black-lung disease, but
the administrative law judge acted irrationally in refusing to credit [the expert's]
346. Lauer, 818 F.2d at 641 (Posner, J., dissenting).
347. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
348. Id. at 643 (Posner, J., dissenting).
349. See Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 234 (7th
Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., dissenting); Anilina Fabrique de Colorants v. Aakash Chems. &
Dyestuffs, Inc., 856 F.2d 873, 882 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., dissenting); Smith v. Dir.,
Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 843 F.2d 1053, 1058 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.,
dissenting).
350. See Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 846 F.2d 416,426 (7th Cir.
1988) (Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Illinois ex rel. Hartigan v.
Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 839 F.2d 1206, 1210 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part), vacated by 852 F.2d 891 (7th Cir. 1988).
351. Smith, 843 F.2d at 1058 (Posner, J., dissenting).
352. "Bdelygma" is an "expression of hatred or abhorrence." RHETORICAL TERMS,
supra note 161, at 186.
353. Smith, 843 F.2d at 1058 (Posner, J., dissenting).
354. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
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evidence."'3 55 He ended his dissent with a proverb: "Corporations, even mining
corporations, are entitled to equal justice under law, no less than widows. We
should not allow sympathy for Smith's family to blind us to our duty .... ,356
In Anilina Fabrique de Colorants v. Aakash Chemicals and Dyestuffs, Inc.,
Judge Posner took vigorous issue with his colleagues for reversing the grant of
a default judgment by the district court judge in "a routine commercial suit" for
collection of the price of goods sold and delivered.357 Deploying ethopoeia35 by
putting himself in the position of the lower court judge, Posner trumpeted the
notes of separation of powers and of judicial efficiency, stating:
The district judge did not exceed her authority in granting a
default judgment and then refusing to set it aside. In deciding
otherwise, my brethren cross the line that separates the powers and
responsibilities of an appellate court from those of a trial court. This
decision will be resented by our district judges and is a setback to the
cause of efficient judicial administration. The threat of default is one
of the district judges' most important tools for obtaining compliance
with litigation schedules. We blunt it by our decision today.359
Continuing with language of indignatio,36° Posner declared: "For a
corporate litigant to show up in court on the day of trial and announce (without
forewarning) that it cannot proceed because it has not retained counsel... is
inexcusable conduct that merits swift and sharp punishment up to and including
the entry of a default judgment. 3 6' He even went to the extent of
commiseratio3 62 by evoking pity for the lower court judge, noting that the judge
was "one of the ablest district judges in this circuit before her recent and much
regretted resignation from the bench," even if she "ran a tight ship" and "reacted
to the defendant's shenanigans more harshly than some judges would have
done.
36 3
355. Id. at 1059 (Posner, J., dissenting).
356. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
357. Anilina Fabrique de Colorants v. Aakash Cherns. & Dyestuffs, Inc., 856 F.2d
873, 882 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., dissenting).
358. See supra note 212.
359. Anilina Fabrique, 856 F.2d at 882 (Posner, J., dissenting).
360. "Indignatio" entails "arousing the audience's scorn and indignation."
RHETORICAL TERMS, supra note 161, at 187.
361. Anilina Fabrique, 856 F.2d at 882 (Posner, J., dissenting).
362. "Commiseratio" involves "evoking pity in the audience." RHETORICAL
TERMS, supra note 161, at 187.
363. Anilina Fabrique, 856 F.2d at 883 (Posner, J., dissenting).
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Antitrust analysis predominated the substance of Judge Posner's dissenting
opinion in Parts and Electric Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Electric, Inc.3" He
encapsulated the basis of his disagreement with the panel majority in a few
elegant lines at the outset of his dissent: "The decision to affirm this antitrust
judgment for $3.7 million... ratifies a miscarriage of justice. There was no
antitrust violation, and the defendant has been denied its right of appellate
review."365 Posner elaborated on his claim of a miscarriage of justice by
observing, in vivid terms: "The result of all this strictissimijuris is to uphold a
jury verdict that is based on a cockeyed view of law and fact, resulting in a
windfall for [the plaintiff] that is both sizeable and undeserved." 3" He chastized
the jury and offered an interpretation of why the commercial case went so badly
by concluding:
The jury's verdict was against the manifest weight of the
evidence on an essential element of the tie-in offense-that the seller
have market power in the market of the tying product. In fact, the
verdict was irrational, a distressingly frequent occurrence in complex
commercial cases, where the issues are remote from the experience
and understanding ofjurors. So clear is the verdict's unreasonableness
that we can order a new trial even though [the trial court judge],
perhaps out of pique at our [earlier] decision reversing him, refused to
do so.3
67
Even his attention to the motives of the indignant trial court judge spoke to
Posner's attention to the motives that surge in and through decision-making.
Among Judge Posner's two mixed concurring/dissenting opinions filed during
1988, his opinion in Reilly v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield United of Wisconsin368
is the most striking for its sarcastic peristrophe,369 turning the majority opinion
writer's (Judge Will) arguments around for Posner's own purpose. Reilly
involved a claim against a group health medical insurer for bad-faith failure to
pay benefits for an in vitro fertilization procedure. In criticizing the panel
opinion's reversal of the district court's summary judgment in favor of the
insurer, Judge Posner mocked the author of the panel opinion in the following
language:
364. 866 F.2d 228, 234 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., dissenting).
365. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
366. Id. at 236 (Posner, J., dissenting).
367. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
368. 846 F.2d 416, 427 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
369. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
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The denial of benefits. .. is a reasonable interpretation of the
plan, and that should be the end of the case. Judge Will, skilled
lawyer that he is, is able to find a number of holes in the defendant's
case-hearsay, lack of expert evidence to counter Mrs. Reilly's
experts (with their impressive credentials), and the implausibility of
classifying a procedure as experimental merely because it has a low
success rate (implying, if pushed to a logical extreme, that all
treatments for the terminally ill are experimental). And he is able to
conjure up a host of unanswered questions concerning the
qualifications of members of the advisory committees .... Judge Will
even questions the validity, as well as the defendant's interpretation,
of the "experimental/investigative" provision ....
All this probing and questioning would be fine if this were a suit
for breach of contract of insurance rather than an action for judicial
review of the denial of a claim for employee benefits, if the burden of
proof in a breach of contract suit were on the defendant rather than the
plaintiff, and if the plaintiff in such a suit were arguing
unconscionability. None of these things is true. Not only has Judge
Will disregarded our role in this proceeding, the nature of the
proceeding, the standard of review, and the burden of proof, but he has
gone beyond the issues framed by the parties ... 370
In Judge Posner's other mixed concurring/dissenting opinion written during
1988-illinois ex rel. Hartigan v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co.-he
provided a scholarly, but dry, multi-faceted analysis of pertinent law and
economic policy considerations replete with case hypotheticals" 7
3. 1989
In 1989 Judge Posner filed three dissenting opinions-all pure dissents.7 2
In G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., Posner dissented from a
Seventh Circuit en banc opinion issued after rehearing, which held that a federal
district court judge acting through a magistrate could properly sanction a
corporate defendant for failing to send a corporate representative to a settlement
370. Reilly, 846 F.2d at 427 (Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
371. Illinois ex rel. Hartigan v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 839 F.2d 1206, 1210
(7th Cir., 1988) (Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
372. See Camden v. Circuit Court, 892 F.2d 610, 619 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.,
dissenting); Int'l Union, United Auto. Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871,
902 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Posner, J., dissenting), rev'd, 499 U.S. 187 (1991); G.
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conference.373 Posner's dissent consisted of an initial nuanced weighing of the
relative advantages of a broad interpretation of a trial judge's settlement
powers37 4 against the disadvantages of such an interpretation.375 Concerned that
the appellate court did not have sufficient information about the practical
consequences of a ruling interpreting a district court's settlement powers broadly
or narrowly, Posner chose to focus on the particular facts of the case at bar, in
a style that Professor Cass Sunstein has characterized as deciding "one case at
a time."376 As Judge Posner reasoned:
There is no federal judicial power to coerce settlement. Oat had made
clear that it was not prepared to settle the case on any terms that
required it to pay money. That was its prerogative, which once
373. Heileman Brewing, 871 F.2d at 657 (Posner, J., dissenting).
374. According to Posner:
[D]ie Not bricht Eisen ["necessity breaks iron"]. Attorneys often are
imperfect agents of their clients, and the workload of our district courts is so
heavy that we should hesitate to deprive them of a potentially useful tool for
effecting settlement, even if there is some difficulty in finding a legal basis for
the tool. Although few attorneys will defy a district court's request to produce
the client, those few cases may be the very ones where the client's presence
would be most conducive to settlement. If I am right that Rule 16(a)
empowers a district court to summon unrepresented parties to a pretrial
conference only because their presence may be necessary to get ready for trial,
we need not infer that the draftsman meant to forbid the summoning of
represented parties for purposes of exploring settlement. The draftsmen may
have been unaware that district courts were asserting a power to command the
presence of a represented party to explore settlement. We should hesitate to
infer inadvertent prohibitions.
Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
375. According to Posner:
[N]othing in [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 16 or in any other rule or
statute confers such a power, and there are obvious dangers in too broad an
interpretation of the federal courts' inherent power to regulate their procedure.
One danger is that it encourages judicial high-handedness ("power corrupts");
several years ago one of the district judges in this circuit ordered Acting
Secretary of Labor Brock to appear before him for settlement discussions on
the very day Brock was scheduled to appear before the Senate for his
confirmation hearing. The broader concern illustrated by the Brock episode
is that in their zeal to settle cases judges may ignore the value of other
people's time. One reason people hire lawyers is to economize on their own
investment of time in resolving disputes. It is pertinent to note in this
connection that Oat is a defendant in this case; it didn't want its executives'
time occupied with this litigation.
Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
376. See CASs R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME (1999).
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exercised made the magistrate's continued insistance on Oat's sending
an executive to [court] arbitrary, unreasonable, willful, and indeed
petulant.377
Judge Posner issued another dissenting opinion from an en banc decision
after rehearing in International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. Johnson Controls, Inc. 7" In
Johnson Controls, the district court found that a company's refusal to employ a
woman, capable of becoming pregnant, to make batteries because of the potential
of toxic injury to her fetus was not a Title VII violation. Reiterating his fact-
sensitive concern and focus on the case at hand,379 Posner voiced his opinion that
it was wrong for the Seventh Circuit, on "so meager a record," to either affirm
the summary judgment below or, in the alternative, to reverse with directions to
the lower court to enter judgment for the plaintiffs.3"" Posner's dissenting
opinion in Johnson Controls is a marvelous example of judicial craftsmanship
in its attention to relevant detail.38" ' It properly focused on the procedural context
of the case;382 it rightly emphasized the narrow scope of a bona fide occupational
qualification as a defense to a claim of sex discrimination;3. 3 it brilliantly
examined the economics of discrimination;38 it incisively evaluated the need for
following other circuit precedent in judicially rewriting the federal employment
discrimination statute to create "a new defense expressly for fetal protection
cases";38 it masterfully anticipated and commented on a variety of theoretical
377. Heileman Brewing, 871 F.2d at 658 (Posner, J., dissenting). Posner ended his
dissenting opinion with the following analysis, alluding to a biblical injunction:
"Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof: We should reverse the district court without
reaching the question whether there are any circumstances in which a district court may
compel a party represented by counsel to attend a pretrial conference." Id. (Posner, J.,
dissenting).
378. 886 F.2d 871, 902 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Posner, J., dissenting), rev'd,
499 U.S. 187 (1991).
379. See supra notes 375-76 and accompanying text.
380. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 902 (Posner, J., dissenting).
381. See Brett G. Scharffs, Law as Craft, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2245,2301-03 (2001).
382. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 902 (Posner, J., dissenting).
383. Id. at 902-03 (Posner, J., dissenting).
384. Id. at 903 (Posner, J., dissenting) (citing GARRYBEcKER, THE ECONOMICS OF
DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971)).
385. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting). In a scholarly aside, in this regard, Posner
observed:
I am not myself deeply shocked that courts sometimes rewrite statutes to
address problems that the legislators did not foresee-a notable but not
isolated example being the judicial interpolation of the word "reasonable" into
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tort law liability issues involving future claims by individuals exposed to harmful
lead while in their mother-employees' wombs;3" and, it sensitively legitimized
the moral and legal concerns of many Americans for the rights of the unborn.3" 7
At the end of his dissent in Johnson Controls, Posner identified what he called
"a host of unanswered questions" that did not appear in the frozen, summary
judgment record of the case.'38 These record deficiencies included (1) "the
feasibility of warnings as a substitute for a blanket exclusion of all fertile
women";389 (2) "what other manufacturers of batteries do about the hazards of
airborne lead to the fetus-whether they are content to rely on warnings, for
example, and if so of what kind and with what effect";39° (3) "the potential
hazard to the fetus through a father exposed to airborne lead";39' (4) the "lack
[of] up-to-date information on the hazards of airborne lead to the fetus";392 (5)
a "blank [record] on the wages and alternative employment opportunities of the
women employed in Johnson Control's battery operation";393 (6) the
"profitab[ility] [of] the business of manufacturing batteries" and its
"vulnerab[ility]... to fears, as yet speculative, of litigation arising from fetal
damage"; 394 and (7) the justification for Johnson Controls' fetal protection policy
given instances when the policy is "excessively cautious."3" In closing, Posner
wrote:
The issue of the legality of fetal protection is as novel and
difficult as it is contentious and the most sensible way to approach it
at this early stage is on a case-by-case basis, involving careful
examination of the facts as developed by the full adversary process of
a trial. The record in this case is too sparse. The district judge jumped
the gun. By affirming on this scanty basis we may be encouraging
incautious employers to adopt fetal protection policies that could
Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
386. Id. at 904-05 (Posner, J., dissenting) (discussing such tort issues as non-
preemption of workers' compensation laws; the joint tortfeasor status of the mother and
the employer; whether the standard for liability would be negligence or strict liability,
whether compliance by the employer with OSHA's rules on airborne lead levels would
be a defense; and the "mass tort" possibility of fetal lead exposure suits bankrupting the
battery industry).
387. Id. at 905-06 (Posner, J., dissenting).
388. Id. at 906 (Posner, J., dissenting).
389. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
390. Id. at 907 (Posner, J., dissenting).
391. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
392. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
393. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
394. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
395. Id. at 907-08 (Posner, J., dissenting).
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endanger the jobs of millions of women for minor gains in fetal safety
and health.396
Posner's third dissenting opinion written in 1989 was in Camden v. Circuit
Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Crawford County, Illinois, because he
objected to the panel majority's conclusion that a criminal defense attorney's
silence in the face of the judge's declaration of a mistrial constituted consent,
and, therefore, was not a violation of the defendant's constitutional entitlement
to be free from double jeopardy.397 At the very end of his dissent, Posner
forcefully summarized the impact of his disagreement with the majority opinion,
crafting the following brevitas:39 "Camden is entitled to her freedom."399 The
gravamen of his dissent was a diasyrmus00 expressed by way of auxesis"'° in a
theatrical recounting of the facts as they would need to be to justify the
majority's opinion:
The first [the defense counsel] learned of the judge's intention to
declare a mistrial was when the judge declared the mistrial and
excused the jurors. The lawyer could hardly have been expected to
interrupt the judge while he was addressing the jury and say, "Wait a
minute, judge, I don't want a mistrial." And once the judge had
thanked the jurors and told them that they were excused and could go
home, the lawyer could not jump up and say, "Wait a minute, judge,
don't let them go." And after they were gone he could not shout,
"Bring them back! Bring them back!" 2
4. 1990
During 1990, Judge Posner authored five dissenting opinions-all pure
dissents.4 3 In a bankruptcy case involving a prior divorce decree, In re
396. Id. at 908 (Posner, J., dissenting).
397. Camden v. Circuit Court, 892 F.2d 610, 619 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.,
dissenting).
398. A "brevitas" is a "concise expression." RHETORiCAL TERMS, supra note 161,
at 185.
399. Camden, 892 F.2d at 622 (Posner, J., dissenting).
400. See supra note 190.
401. "Auxesis" consists of "clauses placed in climactic order." RHETORICAL
TERMS, supra note 161, at 183.
402. Camden, 892 F.2d at 619 (Posner, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
403. See Visser v. Packer Eng'g Assocs., Inc., 909 F.2d 959, 963 (7th Cir. 1990)
(Posner, J., dissenting); United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1331 (7th Cir. 1990)
(en banc) (Posner, J., dissenting), aft'd, 500 U.S. 453 (1991); United States v. Michaud,
907 F.2d 750, 755 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Posner, J., dissenting); Wyletal v. United
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Sanderfoot, Posner vehemently objected to the reasoning and result of the panel
decision which held that a former spouse's lien on the marital home, granted
pursuant to a divorce decree for the purpose of securing payment of equitable
distribution of assets acquired during the marriage, was avoidable as impairing
the former husband's homestead exemption.4° Posner's dissent in Sanderfoot
commenced with eloquent pathopoeia:°  "the fact that a judicial decision
offends the moral sense of laymen does not prove the decision wrong.
Institutional or systemic considerations, themselves morally significant, but
invisible to the laity, may outweigh the tug of simple ofjustice. But they do not
do so here." 6 Next, his dissent usesphilophronesis°3 to softly express Posner's
palpable anger at the majority decision. Appealing to common sense and the
law, he analyzed the husband's "vicious" tactics-and the court's paradoxical
rewarding of his behavior:
The divorce court found that the net value of the Sanderfoots'
marital property, consisting primarily of the couple's home, was
$58,000 and that the property should be split 50-50. No one questions
that this is the proper division. To effect the split, the court awarded
to the husband the couple's home, which had been bought during the
marriage and was jointly owned, and ordered him to pay $29,000 in
cash to the wife. To enforce this order, the court gave her a lien on the
house. The husband did not pay his wife a cent (nor did he comply
with any other order of the divorce court, including an order to provide
child support), but instead declared bankruptcy, claimed a homestead
exemption for the house, and filed a motion.., to avoid the wife's
lien-a tactic designed to nullify (or perhaps to complete the
nullification of) the divorce decree and give the husband all rather than
half the marital property. Today we place the crown ofsuccess on this
vicious scheme. The Bankruptcy Code as liberalized in 1978 is widely
criticized as making bankruptcy an ordinary tool of business planning,
but after today it also will be criticized as a tool by which bounders
defraud their spouses.
States, 907 F.2d 49, 51 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., dissenting); In re Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d
598, 606 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., dissenting), rev'd, 500 U.S. 291 (1991).
404. Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d at 606 (Posner, J., dissenting).
405. "Pathopoeia" is "a general term for arousing passion or emotion."
RHETORICAL TERMS, supra note 161, at 187.
406. Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d at 606 (Posner, J., dissenting). Posner's deep interest
in moral theory and the law culminated nine years after his dissent, in the publication of
a book on the subject. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND
LEGAL THEORY (1999).
407. "Philophronesis" is an "attempt to mitigate anger by gentle speech and humble
submission." RHETORICAL TERMS, supra note 161, at 187.
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This result, a perversion of bankruptcy law, is a product neither
ofjudicial hardheartedness nor oflegislative ineptitude, but ofjudicial
misunderstanding of the lien-avoidance provision of the Bankruptcy
Code."8
Judge Posner's dissenting opinion is a masterful combination of what one
author has termed "the five types of legal argument" 49 arguments "based upon
text, intent, precedent, tradition, or policy analysis."' o First, Posner's dissent
in Sanderfoot addressed the pertinent text of the bankruptcy statute allowing a
debtor in bankruptcy to avoid a judicial lien that impairs an exemption.
According to his analysis, the pertinent provision of the Bankruptcy Code says
that the bankrupt may avoid a judicial lien to the extent that it impairs an
exemption4 ' and "it says that the bankrupt may avoid 'the fixing of' such a lien
'on an interest of the debtor in property.' The debtor must have the interest at
the time the court places the lien on it. That condition is not satisfied here.""4 2
Second, Sanderfoot focused on the intent of Congress in passing the lien
avoidance scheme. Citing pertinent legislative history, Posner contended that
"[t]he purpose-as appears unmistakably from legislative history the purport and
significance of which are unquestioned-is to thwart unsecured creditors who,
sensing impending bankruptcy, rush into court to obtain liens on exempt
property, thus frustrating the purpose of the exemptions."' 3 Distilling the facts
of the case to simple, basic words, Posner's dissent goes on to apply the intent
of Congress to the case at bar:
As explained in [the legislative history], the lien-avoidance provision
allows the debtor to undo the actions of creditors that bring legal
action against the debtor shortly before bankruptcy. Bankruptcy exists
to provide relief for an overburdened debtor. If a creditor beats the
debtor into court, the debtor is nevertheless entitled to his exemptions.
This is not what happened here. No creditor beat the debtor into court.
The lien was created by a court, it is true, but not to enable a creditor
to defeat his debtor's household exemption; it was done to protect a
spouse's preexisting property rights. 414
Third, Posner's dissenting opinion in Sanderfoot perspicaciously
summarized and dissected existing nationalprecedent on the question presented
408. Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d at 606 (Posner, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
409. See WILSON HUHN, THE FIvE TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT (2002).
410. Id. at 13.
411. Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d at 606 (Posner, J., dissenting).
412. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
413. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
414. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting) (quotation marks omitted).
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by the case, concluding that the Seventh Circuit "should go with the Eighth and
Tenth Circuits. We should reverse.1415 Fourth, his dissenting opinion examined
arguments in the case implicating tradition, specifically the role of equity in
resolving the dispute. Posner opined:
I am at a loss to understand why we should strain the language
and ignore the purpose of the lien-avoidance statute in order to achieve
a result that does not promote, but instead denies, simple
justice-layman's justice. I do not expect an argument about this
characterization of our result, because at oral argument the husband's
lawyer admitted that his client's action had subverted the purpose of
the divorce decree. The lawyer added, however, that this did not
matter because (in his words) "bankruptcy is inequitable." I had
thought bankruptcy a branch rather than a rejection of equity. In so
saying I do not endorse a free-wheeling judicial discretion to disregard
either the Bankruptcy Code or the state-law entitlements that the Code
is largely concerned with enforcing.416
Fiflh, Posner engaged inpolicy analysis in his Sanderfoot dissent by noting
the likely social and economic consequences of the majority's approach that will
allow the Bankruptcy Code to become "a tool by which bounders defraud their
spouses."' 7 Moreover, he used policy analysis in the following epimone:"8
I acknowledged at the outset of this opinion, and I repeat, that
superficially unjust results are sometimes made just by institutional
and systemic concerns, such as the desirability of simple rules. If this
were not so, there would never be a tension between legal justice and
substantive justice. But there is no such tension here. Mrs.
Sanderfoot is not asking us to disregard the purpose of Congress, but
to fulfill it by adhering to the precise contours of the lien-avoidance
section. She is asking us not to disregard Congress's words, but to
apply them. She is asking not for a complex rule or vague standard
but for a straightforward distinction between a judicial lien on the
bankrupt's property and a judicial lien intended to secure a spouse's
preexisting interest in marital property. We could do justice here
without deforming the Bankruptcy Code."19
415. Id. at 608 (Posner, J., dissenting).
416. Id. at 607 (Posner, J., dissenting).
417. Id. at 606 (Posner, J., dissenting).
418. An "epimone" constitutes a "refrain; frequent repetition of a phrase or
question." RHETORICAL IERMs, supra note 161, at 190.
419. Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d at 607 (Posner, J., dissenting).
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Judge Posner's next dissenting opinion issued during 1990 was in Wyletal
v. United States-a simple negligence case brought against the government by
an eighty-five year old woman for personal injuries she suffered in a sidewalk
collision with a U.S. Postal Service employee.420 The aesthetic of Posner's
dissent in Wyletal is a combination of his identification with the injured plaintiff,
on the one hand, and identification with the harried federal district court judge,
who did a sloppyjob in finding the facts, on the other hand. Both identifications
constitute a kind of ethopoeia.42" ' Indeed, Posner's approach is an example of
what Professor Schlag calls an aesthetic of "perspectivism"422 At the outset of
the opinion Posner identified, in an ironic way, with the district judge:
It is natural to want to give short shrift to a small case. The
district judge succumbed to the temptation, embodying the findings of
fact that [the federal rules of civil procedure] required him to make in
an unedited oral opinion that neither demonstrates that he performed
his proper function as the trier of fact nor provides an adequate
predicate for our performance of the appellate function.
There were two versions of what happened here. The plaintiff s,
Mrs. Wyletal's, was that she was walking on the sidewalk nine feet
from the row of storefronts from which the defendant's postman, Mr.
Plost, emerged and that he walked into her, presumably at right angles
although her impression was of being struck in the back. Plost's
version of the accident was that Mrs. Wyletal was hugging the
storefronts and walked into him as he stepped out from a recessed
doorway, his view of her blocked by the angle that the recess made
with the inner part of the sidewalk. If her version is correct, Plost was
negligent and she was not, and she is entitled to 100 percent of her
damages. If his version was correct, she was negligent and Plost not,
and she is entitled to nothing.
The district judge was unable to make up his mind whom to
believe. "I'll tell you, I haven't been able to reconcile, given the
conflicting testimony, how this accident happened other than the fact
that both people were equally negligent." But if he couldn't figure out
how the accident had happened, he couldn't determine their relative
negligence. What is more, there were only two versions of the
accident, and in neither were the parties equally negligent. The judge
420. Wyletal v. United States, 907 F.2d 49, 51 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.,
dissenting).
421. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
422. Schlag, supra note 113, at 1081.
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seems just to have thrown up his hands in despair of being able to fird
the facts in this case.423
At the end of the opinion Posner identified, in an empathetic way, with fhe
plaintiff, Mrs. Wyletal:
' The case was squarely within the jurisdiction of the district court,
and would be even if ambitious proposals to overhaul federal
jurisdiction were adopted.... [T]his is not a petty case, fit only for
small-claims court. Although the districtjudge assessed the plaintiff's
damages at only $50,000, she had a colorable claim to a much greater
amount.
And speaking of damages, the $10,000 that the judge awarded for
pain and suffering was shockingly small. An 85 year old woman
broke her hip and as a result must use a walker to walk, and a bar in
the bathroom to lift herself from the toilet seat, and she has suffered
pain and the aggravation of a bladder condition. As the saying goes,
old age is not for sissies; and an 85 year old can expect pain and
suffering even if she does not break her hip. But Mrs. Wyletal is now
almost 90, so that the judge's award comes out to only about $2,000
a year. I am sure she would have paid more than that to have been
spared an accident that broke her hip.
She deserves a better shot from the federal courts. I would
reverse the judgment and remand to the district court for further
findings.424
423. Wyletal, 907 F.2d at 51-52 (Posner, J., dissenting). Posner also identified with
the district court judge, in an ironic manner, by saying, "It might not be a bad rule to
discount an award of damages by the probability that the plaintiff was really entitled to
the award," id. at 52 (Posner, J., dissenting), and, "Another possibility would be to bring
back the old admiralty rule and make each party to a collision bear exactly one half the
total damages caused by it." Id. (Posner, J., dissenting). He concluded: "But none of
these is an authorized approach to deciding which of two versions of an accident is
correct. The approach to that question is given by the rules on burden of proof." Id.
(Posner, J., dissenting). Posner went on, in biting fashion, to state:
The likeliest inference is that the judge didn't think the case worth the care
and attention that would be required to decide, with reasonable though of
course not complete confidence, what happened. This is an understandable
response, since the stakes are modest by the standards of modem federal
litigation .... But it is not a justifiable response.
Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
424. Id. at 52-53 (Posner, J., dissenting).
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In United States v. Michaud, his next dissenting opinion of the year, Judge
Posner disagreed with his Seventh Circuit colleagues' en banc opinion,425 which
reversed a panel decision that he had authored.426 Posner had sided with the
Internal Revenue Service, reversing a district court order which quashed several
summonses issued to the Michauds, which had directed them to submit to
fingerprinting and to provide handwriting exemplars as part of a civil tax
enforcement investigation.427 Posner commenced his dissenting opinion from the
en banc reversal of his panel opinion with the following observation: "The
remand throws a monkey wrench into the machinery for the investigation of tax
violations and in the course of doing so commits a serious error in the
interpretation of the tax-summons statute. 428 Posner followed his metaphorical
statement with a commonplace legal hyperbole: "A fishing expedition into the
government's motives, such as the court invites the district judge to conduct, is
inconsistent with the summary nature of proceedings to enforce tax
summonses."429 By extending the fishing metaphor in the next sentence of his
dissent ("Worse, the court allows the district judge to troll for fish in an area that
Congress has placed beyond judicial authority."),43 Posner fashioned aparable
of sorts on the morality of judicial interference with the will of Congress.43'
In United States v. Marshall, which was consolidated on appeal with United
States v. Chapman, Judge Posner dissented from the en banc majority opinion
that held that the federal drug statute setting mandatory minimum terms of
imprisonment for selling a "mixture or substance" containing LSD included the
weight of the carrier mediuni--blotter paper, sugar cubes or gelatin
cubes-resulting in stiff prison terms for LSD dealers.432 In the course of his
extended dissenting opinion, Posner employed logic, simile433 and precedent in
his bravura attempt to interpret the federal drug statute. He started his dissent
425. United States v. Michaud, 907 F.2d 750, 755 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc)
(Posner, J., dissenting).
426. Id. at 757 (Posner, J., dissenting) (panel decision attached to appendix of en
banc opinion).
427. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
428. Id. at 755 (Posner, J., dissenting).
429. Id. at 755-56 (Posner, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
430. Id. at 756 (Posner, J., dissenting).
431. A "parable" is a metaphorical rhetorical technique designed to "teach[] a
moral by means of an extended metaphor." RHETORICAL TERMS, supra note 161, at 189.
A "metaphor," in turn, involves "changing a word from its literal meaning to one not
properly applicable but analogous to it; assertion of identity rather than, as with simile,
likeness." Id. "Hyperbole"--another metaphoric rhetorical device-involves
"exaggerated or extravagant terms used for emphasis and not to be taken literally." Id.
432. United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1331 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc)
(Posner, J., dissenting), affd, 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
433. A "simile" is an "explicit comparison" often employing the word "like."
RHETORICAL TERMS, supra note 16 1, at 189.
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with the following pragmatic analysis of the different ways contraband drugs are
sold and used, and how drug sale and use should be punished:
Based as it is on weight, the [traditional drug punishment] system
•.. works well for drugs that are sold by weight; and ordinarily the
weight quoted to the buyer is the weight of the dilute form, although
of course price will vary with purity. The dilute form is the product,
and it is as natural to punish its purveyors according to the weight of
the product as it is to punish moonshiners by the weight or volume of
the moonshine they sell rather than by the weight of the alcohol
contained in it. So, for example, under Florida law it is a felony to
possess one or more gallons of moonshine, and a misdemeanor to
possess less than one gallon, regardless of the alcoholic content.
LSD, however, is sold to the consumer by the dose; it is not cut,
diluted, or mixed with something else. Moreover, it is incredibly light.
An average dose of LSD weighs .05 milligrams, which is less than two
millionths of an ounce. To ingest something that small requires
swallowing something much larger. Pure LSD in granular form is first
diluted by being dissolved, usually in alcohol, and then a quantity of
the solution containing one dose of LSD is sprayed or eyedropped on
a sugar cube, or on a cube of gelatin, or, as in the cases before us, on
an inch-square section of "blotter" paper. (LSD blotter paper, which
is sold typically in sheets of ten inches square containing a hundred
sections each with one dose of LSD on it, is considerably thinner than
the paper used to blot ink but much heavier than the LSD itself.) After
the solution is applied to the carrier medium, the alcohol or other
solvent evaporates, leaving an invisible (and undiluted) spot of pure
LSD on the cube or blotter paper. The consumer drops the cube or the
piece of paper into a glass of water, or orange juice, or some other
beverage, causing the LSD to dissolve in the beverage, which is then
drunk. This is not dilution. It is still one dose that is being imbibed.
Two quarts of a 50-proof alcoholic beverage are more than one quart
of a 100-proof beverage, though the total alcoholic content is the same.
But a quart of orange juice containing one dose of LSD is not more,
in any relevant sense, than a pint ofjuice containing the same one
dose, and it would be loony to punish the purveyor of the quart more
heavily than the purveyor of the pint. It would be like basing the
punishment for selling cocaine on the combined weight of the cocaine
and of the vehicle (plane, boat, automobile, or whatever) used to
transport it or the syringe used to inject it or the pipe used to smoke
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it. The blotter paper, sugar cubes, etc. are the vehicles for conveying
LSD to the consumer.434
Posner continued his rhetorical attack on the en banc majority, deploying
iconic prose,435 contending, "To base punishment on the weight of the carrier
medium makes about as much sense as basing punishment on the weight of the
defendant. 436 He also stated,
A person who sells five doses of LSD on sugar cubes is not a worse
person than a manufacturer of LSD who is caught with 19,999 doses
in pure form, but the former is subject to a ten-year mandatory
minimum no-parole sentence while the latter is not even subject to the
five-year minimum.4"
Refining his initial metaphorical musings into a jurisprudential inquiry-and
drawing on four of his favorite intellectual subjects: legal pragmatism, law and
economics, Justice Holmes and Justice Cardozo,438 Posner explored what
Professor Schlag has called an energy aesthetic of the law43 9-the tug and pull
and tension between legal considerations-in his fascinating professional
digression and candid change of mind:
Well, what if anything can we judges do about this mess? The
answer lies in the shadow of a jurisprudential disagreement that is not
less important by virtue of being unavowed by most judges. It is the
disagreement between the severely positivistic view that the content of
law is exhausted in clear, explicit, and definite enactments by or under
express delegation from legislatures, and the natural lawyer's or legal
pragmatist's view that the practice of interpretation and the general
terms of the Constitution (such as "equal protection of the laws")
authorize judges to enrich positive law with moral values and practical
concerns of civilized society. Judges who in other respects have
seemed quite similar, such as Holmes and Cardozo, have taken
opposite sides of this issue. Neither approach is entirely satisfactory.
The first buys political neutrality and a type of objectivity at the price
434. Marshall, 908 )F.2d at 1331-32 (Posner, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).
435. An "icon" involves "painting resemblance by imagery." RHETORICAL TERMS,
supra note 161, at 189.
436. Marshall, 908 F.2d at 1333 (Posner, J., dissenting).
437. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
438. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 77; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW (6th ed. 2003); RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTiERS OF LEGAL THEORY (2001).
439. See Schlag, supra note 113, at 1070-80 (citation omitted).
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of substantive injustice, while the second buys justice in the individual
case at the price of considerable uncertainty and, not infrequently,
judicial willfulness. It is no wonder that our legal system oscillates
between the approaches. The positivist view, applied unflinchingly to
this case, commands the affirmance of prison sentences that are
exceptionally harsh by the standards of the modem Western world,
dictated by an accidental, unintended scheme of punishment
nevertheless implied by the words (taken one by one) of the relevant
enactments. The natural law or pragmatist view leads to a freer
interpretation, one influenced by norms of equal treatment; and let us
explore the interpretive possibilities here. One is to interpret "mixture
or substance containing a detectable amount of [LSD]" to exclude the
carrier medium-the blotter paper, sugar or gelatin cubes, and orange
juice or other beverage. That is the course we rejected [in an earlier
decision], as have the other circuits. I wrote [our prior decision], but
I am no longer confident that its literal interpretation of the statute,
under which the blotter paper, cubes, etc. are "substances" that
"contain" LSD, is inevitable. The blotter paper, etc. are better viewed,
I now think, as carriers, like the package in which a kilo of cocaine
comes wrapped or the bottle in which a fifth of liquor is sold." °
In contrast to his lengthy dissent in Marshall,"' Judge Posner's 1990
dissent in Visser v. Packer Engineering Associates, Inc.4  -an age
discrimination case-was pitby. Focusing on the Schlagian grid aesthetic"3 of
the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act4"-the basic black letter law
of the statute-Posner used the hapless plaintiff s own arguments concerning the
circumstances of his employment termination to support Posner's own argument
that the plaintiff was not fired because of his age." 5 As Posner reasoned in the
first paragraph of his dissent in Visser:
I regret not being able to agree with the majority's disposition of
this appeal. For reasons more fully stated by [the district court judge]
in his opinion granting summary judgment for the defendant, there is
440. Marshall, 908 F.2d at 1334-35 (Posner, J., dissenting). Posner's dissent
culminated in an interesting constitutional analysis that viewed the criminal sentencing
scheme the majority endorsed as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 1336 (Posner, J., dissenting).
441. See supra notes 441-49 and accompanying text.
442. 909 F.2d 959, 963 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., dissenting).
443. See Schlag, supra note 113, at 1055-70.
444. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
445. This rhetorical technique is known as a "peristrophe," a technique Posner used
in other dissents. See, e.g., supra note 274 and accompanying text.
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no possible doubt that the plaintiff would have been fired no matter
what his age or his pension entitlements. By plaintiffs own account,
Kenneth Packer, the defendant's chief executive officer, is vengeful,
vicious, and unethical; the plaintiff crossed Packer; this sealed the
plaintiff's fate. Because the plaintiff was approaching the time at
which his pension rights would vest, Packer's vengeance was
particularly sweet: not only was he getting rid of an employee who
defied him, but he was screwing the employee out of a pension. (The
affidavits of the plaintiff's pals state merely that Packer was a nasty
guy aware of Visser's pension status.)4"
As Posner explained in the second, and final, paragraph of his opinion,
while Visser's boss was crel id unjust, this did not give Visser a cause of
action for age discrimination."'
5. 1991
During 1991, the completion of his first decade on the federal appellate
bench, Judge Posner issued five dissenting opinions-four pure dissents 8 and
one mixed concurring/dissenting opinion."9
In his first dissenting opinion of 1991, Aqua-Chem, Inc. v. National Labor
Relations Board, Judge Posner took issue with a majority of his colleagues on
the Seventh Circuit who decided to deny a petition for rehearing en banc in a
labor dispute involving the rights of workers who replaced striking workers.45°
In Posner's view, the panel decision was inconsistent with existing Seventh
Circuit precedent and the precedent of other circuits and deserved to be re-
examined. Deploying diallage,45" ' he concluded: "The role of the replacement
446. Visser, 909 F.2d at 963 (Posner, J., dissenting).
447. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
[Plaintiff] was fired not because of age, but, by his own account of what
happened, because he was disloyal to his boss. He may have been treated
shabbily, cruelly, unjustly, but the Age Discrimination in Employment Act is
not a tenure statute for the older employee. It is not a shield against corporate
arbitrariness. It does not smite the vengeful.
Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
448. See United States v. Chapple, 942 F.2d 439, 442 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Best, 939 F.2d 425, 432 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (Posner,
J., dissenting); Dimeo v. Griffin, 924 F.2d 664, 676 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.,
dissenting), vacated by 931 F.2d 1215 (7th Cir. 1991); Aqua-Chem, Inc. v. NLRB, 922
F.2d 403,404 (7th Cir. 1991) (denial of reh'g en banc) (Posner, J., dissenting).
449. United States v. Bafia, 949 F.2d 1465, 1481 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
450. Aqua-Chem, 922 F.2d at 403 (Posner, J., dissenting).
451. "Diallage" entails "bringing several arguments to establish a single point."
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worker is fundamental in cont,!mporary labor relations. The panel's decision
muddies that role, unsettles the law, buries the rights of management and labor
alike in uncertainty and confusion. We should rehear the case en banc."4 2
Jumping from a labor law dispute to a horse racing case, in Dimeo v.
Griffin-a case involving the constitutionality of a random urine drug-testing
policy adopted by the Illinois Racing Board-Judge Posner utilizedperistrophe
in the initial sentence of his dissenting opinion:" 3 "The majority opinion makes
so strong a case against its own result that I have little more to do here than to
express my perplexity at that result [which found the urine testing policy to be
unconstitutional]." '454  Then, blending comprobatio4" into the mix, Posner
focused on the unique nature of Judge Harlington Wood, Jr.'s majority opinion:
As is obvious from the opinion, Judge Wood is not only a
distinguished judge but also an experienced horseman. He realizes,
therefore, and is scrupulous to point out, that the nonequestrian district
judge underrated the dangers of horse racing (including harness
racing). A jockey who is high on drugs can easily kill himself, or a
valuable and delicate animal, or another jockey; a drug-impaired
starter or assistant starter is also a menace, as Judge Wood explains,
and if less likely than a jockey to kill a person or an animal is still
quite likely to ruin the race. These are real, not hypothetical, dangers.
Drugs are a real, not a hypothetical, problem in horse racing; horse
racing is an intrinsically dangerous sport; and random drug testing is
at once an important deterrent to the use of illegal drugs and a
relatively minor invasion of personal privacy-the regulation at issue
here limits the number of random drug tests per person per year to
five.45
6
RHETORICAL TERMS, supra note 161, at 192.
452. Aqua-Chem, 922 F.2d at 404 (Posner, J., dissenting).
453. Dimeo, 924 F.2d at 676 (Posner, J., dissenting); see supra notes 274 & 445
and accompanying text.
454. Dimeo, 924 F.2d at 676 (Posner, J., dissenting).
455. "Comprobatio" is "complimenting one's judges or hearers." RHETORICAL
TERMS, supra note 161, at 187.
456. Dimeo, 924 F.2d at 676 (Posner, J., dissenting). Judge Wood's majority
opinion in Dimeo was a scholarly exegesis of the history and nature of horse racing and
the specifics of the Illinois urine-testing program. See id. at 664-76 (majority opinion
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Posner's Dimeo dissent continued with a skillful and succinct analysis of
existing precedent,457 followed by a dinumeratio at the end of his opinion.45 s
Posner used the technique of progressio"' to elaborate--in the law and
economics style that he so dearly loves-on the application of the Learned Hand
balancing test"' in the context of constitutional interpretation:
[W]e have a persuasive argument-which Judge Wood not only
accepts but emphasizes-that horse racing under the influence of
drugs poses a danger to life and limb.
Not-granted-the same level of danger as would be created by
placing the Strategic Air Command in the hands of drug addicts. But
magnitude of danger is not the only consideration. Probability of
accident is also important. The product of magnitude and probability
is, indeed, expected accident cost. That cost is high in horse racing
because it is a dangerous sport and because the inherent dangers
interact with the loss of judgment and control caused by drug use to
make the drug-infested horse race a scene of enormous danger. The
danger is, it is true, mainly to participants in the race. But jockeys
have a right to be protected against the dangers posed by fellow
jockeys (and starters and assistant starters) who use drugs; you do not
become an outlaw by becoming a jockey. The court disparages the
state's interest in protecting its revenues from parimutuel betting by
keeping horse racing free of drugs. But that interest should not be
considered separately. It should be considered together with the
state's interest-paternalistic as it might seem to afollower ofHerbert
Spencer-in the safety of the participants in the horse race, not to
mention the owners' interest in the lives of their precious animals.
When all the interests in random drug testing oflockeys and other race
participants are summed-the safety interest paramount, but reinforced
by financial and property interests-the case for the minor invasion of
privacy involved in requiring the occasional giving of a urine
specimen (something everyone who has an annual physical
examination gives willingly and without a sense of embarrassment) is
decisive. The invasion of privacy is reasonable in the circumstances,
and that is the Fourth Amendment test.46'
457. Id. at 676 (Posner, J., dissenting).
458. A "dinumeratio" is "(1) amplifying a general fact or idea by giving all of its
details; (2) a summary or recapitulation." RHETORICAL TERMS, supra note 161, at 183.
459. "Progressio" is "building a point around a series of comparisons." Id. at 185.
460. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)
("if the probability be called P; the injury L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon
whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B less than PL").
461. Dimeo, 924 F.2d at 676-77 (Posner, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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Judge Posner's next dissenting opinion written during 1991 was in United
States v. Best."2 The majority opinion framed the issue in Best as "whether the
defendants were deprived of a fair trial due to the presence of binders containing
certain government exhibits in the jury room during deliberations." ' Inaprior
panel decision, the Seventh Circuit "held that the presence of the binders during
jury deliberations was jury tampering that constituted reversible error";" upon
rehearing en banc the court held "that the presence of the binders in the jury
room was not error," thereby affirming the defendant's conviction for fraud,
misapplication of bank funds and bank fraud." 5 Posner's dissent in Best presents
the details of how the complex, seven-week criminal trial was conducted. It
informs readers of the role of the binders-not admitted into evidence-in
unfairly convicting the defendants. Posner used his extraordinary narrative skill
and created apt analogies to convey his argument, and presented the following
riveting account of the prejudicial impact of allowing the jury to have considered
the prosecution-supplied "loose- leaf binder [to each juror] containing the key
government exhibits, arranged by transaction, to assist the jury in following the
evidence": 6
Both the district court and this court make much of the fact that
all exhibits in the government's binders had been admitted into
evidence. That cannot be the end of our inquiry. If the prosecutor had
entered the jury room during the jurors' deliberations and told the
jurors that if they examined the original exhibits in the following
sequence it would help them to understand the defendants' guilt, no
judge would think that the fact that all the exhibits were in evidence
would save the conviction. Instead of visiting the jury room in person
the prosecutor sent into it a roadmap to a guilty verdict, in the form of
suggestively sequenced selections from nine boxes of government
exhibits, for the jurors to use in their deliberations. The ordering of
familiar materials is a form of creativity recognized in law: you can
copyright a compilation of materials that are in the public domain.
And you can convict a man by a tendentious compilation of exhibits
already in evidence." 7
Later in his Best dissent, Posner employed literary allusion ("The
binders-Ariadne's thread through the maze constituted by the ten boxes of
462. 939 F.2d 425, 432 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (Posner, J., dissenting).
463. Id. at 425-26.
464. Id. at 426.
465. Id.
466. Id. at 432 (Posner, J., dissenting).
467. Id. at 433 (Posner, J., dissenting).
2004]
81
Blomquist: Blomquist: Dissent, Posner-Style:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
original exhibits-were not in evidence.")" and caustic sarcasm ("The [trial]
judge's perfunctory and loaded inquiry (e.g., 'Did you use the jury book to the
exclusion of all the other exhibits and evidence you heard in the case?') suggests
more than anything else a determination not to have to sit through another seven-
week trial.")" 9 to vigorously bring home his point.
In United States v. Chapple-another criminal appeal-Judge Posner took
the prosecution's side in dissenting from the panel majority's view that a
criminal convict's possession of a handgun in the waistband of his trousers was
not an offense "that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another," within the meaning of the federal sentencing guidelines that mandated
a stiffer penalty of incarceration in a later federal prosecution.470 Using
evocative hypothetical exemplums47 to prove his point, Posner, as usual, drew
on his imagination and ability to recognize everyday human behavior to engage
the reader's support:
I have trouble imagining a more provocative act than a felon's carrying
a loaded gun in public view while traveling on public transportation
[in a taxicab] in a crowded city. He is flaunting his defiance of the
law, A quarrel with the taxi driver, a jostle by the crowd, a gesture of
fear or anger by an onlooker alarmed or indignant at such a
display-any of these incidents might have occurred and led to the
gun's being fired and killing or wounding someone.""
Finally, in his last dissent of 1991, roughly rounding out his first decade on
the federal appellate bench, Judge Posner in United States v. Bafia disagreed in
part with his panel colleagues regarding the application of the federal statutory
"kingpin" sentencing enhancement provision. 73 In a somewhat hypertechnical
approach, Posner quibbled with the majority's remand instructions on the
application of the drug kingpin sentencing enhancement statute because of an
insufficient number of "slots" in the defendant Cappas' criminal organization.474
In an impressive use of conduplicatio,4" Posner mentioned the word "kingpin"
468. Id. at 435 (Posner, J., dissenting).
469. Id. (Posner, J., dissenting).
470. United States v. Chapple, 942 F.2d 439, 442 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.,
dissenting).
471. An "exemplum" consists of "an example cited, either true or feigned;
illustrative anecdote." RHETORICAL TERMS, supra note 161, at 188.
472. Chapple, 942 F.2d at 443 (Posner, J., dissenting).
473. United States v. Bafia, 949 F.2d 1465, 1481 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
474. Id. (Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
475. "Conduplicatio" involves "repetition of a word or words in succeeding
clauses." RHETORICAL TERMS, supra note 161, at 190.
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a total of eleven times in the course of an opinion that took up less than a full
page of the Federal Reports. In a kind of legal fable,476 Posner provides the
following creative allegory to bolster his view that a new trial was required with
appropriate jury instructions on the issue of the drug kingpin charge as to
Cappas:
A two-man band is not a large organization no matter how many times
the second player is replaced. A six-man band is a large organization
within the sense of the statute even if not all six players are playing at
once. I assume that if through electronic wizardry two players can
play all six instruments at once it's still not a six-piece band within the
meaning of the statute .... 4"
IV. SOME THEORETICAL INSIGHTS
A. Judge Posner's Evolving Style: Pragmatic Dissent
During his first few years as a federal appellate judge, Judge Posner seemed
chiefly motivated to write dissenting opinions to satisfy a cathartic need to
express his dissatisfaction with sloppy, inefficient or shopworn legal reasoning.
In 1981 and 1982 Judge Posner's style was generally patient, respectful, and
collaborative.478 However, one can observe a sea change during 1983, when
Posner published a total of eight dissenting opinions. In 1983, Posner's dissent
style became more confident, less collaborative, and more caustic."" In reading
through his 1983 dissenting opinions we can discern Posner-the-academic,480
Posner-the-tendentious-economist,48' Posner-the-taskmaster,482 and Posner-the-
Cassandra." 3 But as exemplified in his superb dissenting opinion in DePass v.
United States, we can also perceive Posner-the-humanitarian coupled with
Posner-the-epistemologist 4 in his dissenting stylistics during 1983. During
1984 and 1985, Judge Posner's quantitative output of dissenting opinions
continued to rapidly grow."'
476. A "fable" is "a short, allegorical story." Id. at 188.
477. Bafia, 949 F.2d at 1481 (Posner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
478. See supra notes 141-55 and accompanying text.
479. See supra notes 156-94 and accompanying text.
480. See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
481. See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
482. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
483. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
484. See supra notes 167-76 and accompanying text.
485. See supra notes 196-287 and accompanying text.
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Opinions that best characterize his style during this timeframe were in
United States v. Markgraf(a dissent that champions the rights of a farm couple
by poetically imagining both how this couple might feel about having their home
foreclosed by the government as well as how Congress might have wanted the
dispute to be decided),86 Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc. (an opinion
where Posner deftly utilizes irony to sympathize with the majority, yet insist
upon the recognition of strict constitutional principles),4"7 Haffner v. United
States (a dissent that makes us laugh at the folly of the majority's statutory
interpretation)4 8 andBritton v. South Bend Community School Corp. (an opinion
where Posner eloquently and passionately addresses the unfairness of reverse
discrimination against whites). 89 During 1986-his fifth year on the federal
appellate bench-Judge Posner began a pattern of less frequent dissent; his most
attractive dissenting opinion written in 1986 was in United States v. Green
(masterfully deploying many stylistic devices to uncover the injustice of a
conviction for mail fraud).490 Yet, during 1981-1986, Judge Posner also issued
some ugly dissenting opinions-exemplified by his stylistics in Alliance to End
Repression v. City of Chicago49' and Chaulk v. Volkswagen of America,
Inc. 92-which were characterized by overly-aggressive personal attacks.
Judge Posner's dissenting opinion style during 1987-1991-the second part
of his first decade as a federal appellate judge-was generally most attractive
when he used empathy as a stylistic technique-as in Anilina Fabrique de
Colorants v. Aakash Chemicals and Dyestuffs493 and Wyletal v. United
States494 -and generally least attractive when he directly or indirectly made
personal attacks-as in Reilly v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield United of
Wisconsin495 and Visser v. Packer Engineering Associates, Inc.4 96 Importantly,
however, in three superb dissenting opinions written during this time period,
Judge Posner demonstrated aesthetic sublimity: International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America v.
Johnson Controls, Inc. 49 In re Sanderfoot49 s and United States v. Marshall.4 99
486. See supra notes 208-15 and accompanying text.
487. See supra notes 216-27 and accompanying text.
488. See supra notes 248-51 and accompanying text.
489. See supra notes 260-75 and accompanying text.
490. See supra notes 291-304 and accompanying text.
491. See supra notes 233-39 and accompanying text.
492. See supra notes 324-26 and accompanying text.
493. See supra notes 357-63 and accompanying text.
494. See supra notes 420-22 and accompanying text.
495. See supra notes 368-70 and accompanying text.
496. See supra notes 441-46 and accompanying text.
497. See supra notes 378-96 and accompanying text.
498. See supra notes 404-19 and accompanying text.
499. See supra notes 432-40 and accompanying text.
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In these three dissenting opinions-the most aesthetically pleasing dissents of his
first decade on the bench-Judge Posner amply demonstrated the aesthetic
virtues of technical virtuosity (in being able to masterfully combine numerous
stylistic techniques in a dissenting performance that was greater than the sum of
the individual parts of the dissenting opinion) and connoisseurship (in expertly
judging the appeal and persuasiveness of his stylistic techniques). In sum, it is
apparent that at the end of his first decade as a federal appellate judge, Posner
had learned to breathe life and power into his dissenting opinions by deploying
a number of attractive stylistic techniques, while, from time to time, forgetting
what he had learned and dissenting in grating, displeasing, ugly ways.
Moreover, in his best dissents Posner displayed remarkable writerly calculation
of the winning effect his prose would have-entertaining his readers and
confidently drawing them pictures of human behaviors and motives.
B. The Aesthetics of Judicial Dissenting Style
As Posner has implied in his academic writings, 5°° good judicial opinion
style seemingly possesses certain generic qualities that transcend the genre of the
opinion-whether it is, for example, a majority opinion, a concurring opinion,
a dissenting opinion, a mixed concurring/dissenting opinion, a panel opinion, or
an opinion derived from an en banc court. Thus, according to this approach, any
stylistically good judicial opinion might be expected to exhibit some or all of the
following stylistic characteristics: common sense; a felicitous discussion of
relevant precedents and customs; a nuanced interpretation of pertinent texts; a
practical analysis of critical public policies; an elegant expression of appropriate
institutional considerations; a knowledgeable exposition and application of
critical evidentiary and empirical data; and a moving, but subdued, articulation
of powerful emotional factors.
However, because a separate judicial opinion always departs from a
majority opinion in a self-conscious way (led off by language that indicates, by
way of illustration, that Judge X is "dissenting" or "concurring in part"), the
reader of a separate judicial opinion will tend to be more intensely and routinely
aware that the opinion writer is attempting to draw attention not only to the
content of her opinion but, often more importantly, to the performance of her
opinion. Moreover, a reader of a dissenting opinion is arguably even more
acutely aware of the performance aspect of the dissenter than in the case of a
pure concurring opinion since, by definition, the concurring judge agrees with
the majority holding but simply wants to clarify a different matrix of rule-based
reasoning that supports the majority holding. "Generally, style applies to those
sorts of artefacts and performances which communicate partly by inviting our
conscious recognition that they are to be regarded as artefacts or
500. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
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performances."' ' So, many authors of majority appellate opinions probably
intend to make their opinion style as transparent as possible and to concentrate
on the rule-based substance of the judicial pronouncement because a majority
opinion is written for the court and might not typically be expected to be a self-
conscious performance or artifact. This is so because "to refer to the style (or
stylishness) of what we normally suppose should not be a self-conscious
performance, not a self-consciously produced artefact, is normally pejorative.""0 2
Thus,
[i]t is, for example, not normally a compliment to refer to the style in
which someone makes love, or to the style with which a student
explains the lateness of an essay; to the style of a mechanic's cleaning
rags, or an academic's rough notepaper. Style in the wrong place can
be meretricious.0 3
Furthermore, a majority appellate judicial decision can be thought of as a natural
object-something that exists by virtue of our system of hierarchical judicial
review and the institutional expectation that an appellate court will usually give
reasons for its decision. Thus, to ascribe stylistic qualities to a majority opinion
might be problematic in the same philosophical way that "neither a volcano nor
a potato can have a style."'5'  A dissenting appellate judicial decision, in
contradistinction, is not typical-in a sense, it usually is surprising-and,
therefore, is not a natural object of the appellate judicial process. Style, then, is
arguably more important and relevant in the case of a dissenting opinion (indeed,
any separate opinion including a pure concurring opinion) than in the case of a
majority opinion.
A robust aesthetic theory of dissenting opinion style would require us to
focus on certain subtle moral conceptions of the dissenting "performance"
because "[e]valuative disputes about style tend inevitably to look towards
concepts of integrity and honesty (in design, performance or in unperformed
behaviour), and to their polar opposites."' ' This is so because our evaluations
"have to do with our sense of how we may, or may fail to, see through the ways
in which something is made or performed to deeper matters of the agent's
thought and intention." '  Attention to rhetoric, writ large then (in the grand
Aristotelean sense of ethos, pathos, and logos"07 in addition to particularized





505. Id. (emphasis added).
506. Id.
507. See generally ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RHETORIC 99 (Thomas 0. Sloane ed., 200 1).
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rhetorical techniques. 8), should be critical in our aesthetic reaction to particular
dissenting opinions. Yet, since different appellate judges will tend to deploy
certain favorite congeries of rhetorical techniques in their dissenting
performances-as illustrated by my examination of Judge Posner's dissenting
opinions during his first decade as a federal appellate judge5°9-it is tempting to
frame dissenting judicial style as the equivalent of signature, "as if one might
'peel off' the external manner of production from an inner kernel that could be
given a different casing."5' ° As explained, by way of illustration, in a recent
book on aesthetic theory:
In this sense it can be an intelligible exercise to rewrite a poem or a
musical piece in the style of another or of another period. Thus we
might construe the concept of style as "signature". Individual artists,
authors, composers, types of people and identifiable periods and
movements have their characteristic styles. The recognition of such
stylistic signatures, therefore, may be the central skill of a certain kind
of connoisseurship, a highly saleable skill for antique dealers, a taught
skill in many English literature courses, an examined skill in "dating"
documents; and a rich source not only for the forger's art, but, more
importantly, for a high variety of fictional devices... .'
Thus, for example, we might describe some of Judge Posner's judicial
opinions as "sexy"-as I did in an article on his general opinion style during his
According to Aristotle's classic work, On Rhetoric:
Means of persuasion are either nonartistic-laws, witnesses, contracts, or
oaths, used but not invented by the speaker-or artistic, the invention of the
speaker. Artistic means of persuasion take three forms, which have come to
be known as ethos, the presentation of the character of the speaker as a person
to be trusted; pathos, the emotions of the audience as stirred by the speaker;
and logos, logical argument based on evidence and probability.
Id.
508. As illustrated in my examination of Judge Posner's style in early dissenting
opinions, see supra notes 141-499 and accompanying text, there are a variety of classical
rhetorical terms to describe a text's attempts to persuade the reader. Thus specific
rhetorical terms exist to describe the following: addition, subtraction and substitution of
letters, syllables, word phrases and clauses; amplification; balance, antithesis and
paradox; brevity, physical description; emotional appeals; example, allusion and citation
to authority, metaphorical substitutions and puns; repetition of letters, syllables, sounds,
words, clauses, phrases and ideas; techniques of argument; and ungrammatical, illogical,
or unusual uses of language. See RHETORICAL TERMS, supra note 161, at 181.
509. See supra notes 138-499 and accompanying text.
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rookie season on the federal appellate bench. 12 A theorist ofjudicial dissenting
style might label the "Posner dissenting signature" during his first decade as a
judge-depending on whether the critic was a connoisseur of military strategy,
wine tasting, film, furniture or cold water swimming-in some, or all, of the
following terns: "precision bombing runs," "citric with amemorable aftertaste,"
"a clockwork green (as in economics)," "severely utilitarian," and "delightfully
bracing."
It is probably misguided, however, to make a sharp differentiation between
a "stylistic skin and an inner kernel"' 3 in evaluating dissenting judicial opinion
style because such a theoretical approach tends to overemphasize reader whim.
Of equal, if not greater importance to the quality of a dissenting opinion is
author-intentionality or what might be alternatively called thematic
authority-use of a style of dissent that controls and channels a reader's response
in the direction demanded by the dissenting judge. A fair reading of Judge
Posner's first decade of dissenting opinions leads to a mixed assessment: at his
best, he directs the flow or argument according to his intentions; at his worst,
however, he elicits a knee-jerk reaction against his rich law and economics
parlance, sometimes grating ad hominen rhetoric, and occasional shrill
protestations. The deep meaning of this mixed assessment seems to relate to
Judge Posner's all-too-human temptation during his early years on the bench to
have periodically lapsed into a meretricious dissenting style-a "mere production
and reproduction of style-as-signature"1 4 that easily apes his past dissents in a
kind of "facile self-imitation."5"5
Posner's most effective dissenting opinions during his first decade as a
judge were those that deployed style as a handmaiden of morality-dissenting
opinions that paid serious attention to, and managed to orchestrate, the integrity
and honesty of the argumentation, rather than engaging in "self-conscious
posturing."516 Over time Posner became more pragmatic-in the fights he
picked with the majority, in the stylistics of his dissents, and in his role as ajudge
interacting with his colleagues. Indeed, after I finished the first draft of this
Article, I picked up Posner's latest book, published in early 2003, and read a
passage that succinctly explains his own underlying judicial character and legal
philosophy--and ultimately his own dissenting opinion style-that started to
emerge during his first decade on the bench. According to Posner:
An everyday pragmatist in law, an everyday-pragmatist judge for
example, wants to know what is at stake in a practical sense in
512. See Blomquist, supra note 1.
513. AESTHETICS, supra note 501, at 404.
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deciding a case one way or another. This does not mean, as detractors
of legal pragmatism such as Ronald Dworkin assert, that such a judge
is concerned solely with immediate consequences and the short term.
The pragmatic judge does not deny the standard rule-of-law virtues of
generality, predictability, and impartiality, which generally favor a
stand-pat approach to novel legal disputes. He just refuses to reify or
sacralize those virtues. He dares to balance them against the
adaptationist virtues of deciding the case at hand in a way that
produces the best consequences for the parties and those similarly
circumstanced. He is impatient with abstractions... with slogans
... and with highfalutin rhetoric of absolutes-unless he is persuaded
that such flag-waving has practical social value. For the everyday
pragmatist... moral, political, and legal theories have value only as
rhetoric, not as philosophy.517
V. CONCLUSION
Judge Richard A. Posner's dissenting opinions written during his first ten
years as a federal appellate judge are, in general, interesting, memorable and
even entertaining to read. This is so in large part (and despite occasional lapses)
because of what might be summed up as a pragmatic style of dissent--one that
skillfully and effectively deploys various rhetorical techniques in the service of
clearly stated substantive points of law and compelling principles ofjustice and
morality to achieve practical ends of the parties in the lawsuits and those
similarly situated. Judge Posner's dissenting style is not typical. Other appellate
judges, more typically, demonstrate an ideological style of dissent and are more
interested in scoring abstract debating points than evaluating practical
consequences.
A study of Judge Posner's pragmatic dissenting style, moreover, provides
food for thought in helping us to theorize on an overriding conception of the
aesthetics of dissenting opinion style-a project that needs and deserves
further work.""8
517. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY 12 (2003).
518. Another potential issue in the ongoing project of theorizing on the aesthetics
of dissenting opinion style might include a comparison of modern American dissenting
opinion style with the way others in positions of cultural power have engaged in the
"complex process of self-fashioning." See STEPHEN GREENBLATT, RENAISSANCE SELF-
FASHIONING: FROM MORE TO SHAKESPEARE 6 (1980). Moreover, it might be intriguing
to compare what aesthetic theorists in other genres have argued are universal,
indispensable qualities of great art with possible universal and indispensable qualities of
great dissenting opinions. Cf. ITALO CALVINO, SIX MEMOS FOR THE NEXT MILLENNIUM
(1988) (arguing for six critical aesthetic qualities of all great imaginative literature:
lightness, quickness, exactitude, visibility, multiplicity and consistency).
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